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**ENHANCING HUNGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES THROUGH
TRANSFORMATION—THE SHIFT TO SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES**

by

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June 2010

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**ENHANCING HUNGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES THROUGH
TRANSFORMATION—THE SHIFT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis is to highlight the challenges posed by the further development of the Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) and to provide a viable alternative for facilitating the consolidation. The study utilizes historical examples of Special Forces units, organizational design theory and statistical analysis of the empirical research of HUNSF's bureaucratic environment. The key findings are that the challenges HUNSF faces show similarities with the evolution of other Special Forces and the challenges are in connection with the actual development stage of HUNSF as an organization.

The analysis of the empirical research revealed that the permissiveness of the bureaucratic environment depends most on: the degree of military organizational value alignment between the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) and HUNSF, and HUNSF's perceived disrespect toward the HDF. Moreover, HUNSF, in its present stage of organizational evolution, must become more appreciative of its potentially accommodating bureaucratic environment; the current dependence on influential individual sponsors must be replaced by institutionalized sponsorship; for HUNSF to become an enhanced HDF asset, the present special forces capacity must be turned into a Special Operations Forces capacity on the tactical, operational and strategic level with adequate representation. The thesis provides a viable alternative for implementing the necessary adjustments.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AJP	Allied Joint Publications
AOO	Area of Operation
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
CJFSOCC	Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command
CS	Combat Support
C/SAR	Combat/Search and Rescue
CSS	Combat Service Support
DA	Direct Action
DCOM	Deputy Commander
DV	Dependent Variable
EU	European Union
FW	Fixed-wing (Aircraft)
HDF	Hungarian Defense Forces
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HUNSF	Hungarian Special Forces
HUNSOF	Hungarian Special Operations Forces
INFOSEC	Information Security
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
IV	Independent Variable
IW	Irregular Warfare
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JFC	Joint Force Command
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
KAIA	Kabul International Airport
MA	Military Assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer

NDU	National Defense University
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSCC	NATO Special Operations Coordination Center
NSFQC	NATO Special Forces Qualification Course
OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RW	Rotary-wing (Aircraft)
SAS	Special Air Service
SEAL	Sea, Air, Land
SF	Special Forces
SFCO	Special Forces Qualification Course
SFD-D	Special Forces Detachment-Delta
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, Europe
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFEVAL	Special Operations Forces Evaluation
SOTG	Special Operations Task Group
SOTU	Special Operations Task Unit
SOWG	Special Operations Working Group
SR	Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance
SS	Steam Ship
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCLA	University of California at Los Angeles
UOF	Unconventional Operations Forces
USASF	United States Army Special Forces
USS	United States Ship
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The Hungarian Ministry of Defense (MoD) occupies a multi-story and rather unattractive building in the heart of the country's otherwise pretty capital city. In early 2003, a handful of devoted military officers gathered in one of the offices of the MoD's Operations and Training Department on the "0" floor, which was commonly referred as "The Vault." Even though the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) were in the process of reorganization—which also meant the downsizing of the forces—these men were about to propose a new unit: a special forces (SF) battalion.¹ Despite the downscaling, the HDF 34th László Bercsényi Special Forces Battalion (34th SF Battalion) was formed in September 2005 on the basis of the HDF 34th Reconnaissance Battalion, and it was almost immediately considered the HDF's "elite unit."²

It has been seven years since that meeting in "The Vault" and nearly five since the formation of the 34th SF Battalion. Conceiving and bearing the "child" was challenging enough for some founders to lose, or at least abandon, their faith that their "infant" will ever become a young adult, let alone graduate college. Nevertheless, some exams have already been passed and graduation is scheduled for the end of 2010, when elements of the 34th SF Battalion will have

¹ Whereas it certainly took the effort of a group of dedicated individuals to create the tactical special forces capacity, the HDF comprehensive defense review, conducted in 2003, served as the legal basis for the establishment of the 34th SF Battalion.

Imre Porkoláb, *A különleges műveleti erők szerepe az aszimmetrikus kihívásokból adódó katonai feladatok tükrében, különös tekintettel a nemzetközi terrorizmus elleni küzdelemre (The role of special operations forces in asymmetric military threats, specifically in the struggle against transnational terrorism)*, PhD Dissertation, Hadtudományi Iskola, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem (Budapest: Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, 2008), 3.

² Honvédelmi Minisztérium Magyar Honvédség, *MH 34. Bercsényi László Különleges Műveleti Zászlóalj (HDF 34th Special Forces Battalion)*, March 15, 2005, http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/mh_34._bercsenyi_laszlo_kulonleges_muveleti_zaszloalj (accessed February 3, 2010).

to meet NATO's criteria for Special Operations Forces³ and have an able and deployable Special Operations Task Group.⁴ By then a number of the 34th SF Battalion's existing Special Operations Task Units⁵ (SOTU) will also have had combat experience, as one at a time it is deployed in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) SOCCE⁶ Kabul. Also, as an effort to boost national and allied SF capacity, in February 2010, the HDF launched the NATO Special Forces Qualification Course, which is the very first such course to take place in Europe—or anywhere else outside the United States, for that matter.

³ These criteria are formalized in the MoD's Force Proposals to the NATO (reference No. EL 0035) and the NATO Special Operations Headquarters' (NSHQ) SOFEVAL Criteria document.

Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Hungary, *The Republic of Hungary's Force Proposals to the NATO*, reference No. EL 0035 (Budapest: Ministry of Defense, 2007).

⁴ "Special Operations Task Group: (1) A SOTG is a national grouping of SOF that is employed to conduct special operations as directed by the commander CJFSOCC. A SOTG can be land or maritime oriented and is normally composed of: (a) A HQ that is capable of conducting the J1-J6 staff functions; (b) Subordinate SOTUs; (c) CS units; and (d) CSS elements."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 3–4.

⁵ "A SOTU is the lowest level of a SOF tactical level combat element that deploys by air, land, or sea and is able to conduct SR, DA, or MA. A SOTU is normally comprised of 4–16 personnel, and should be capable of split-team operations."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 3–5.

⁶ "Special Operations Command and Control Element. When SOF operate directly in the area of operations (AOO) of conventional forces, or when the likelihood of integrated or converging operations with conventional forces is probable in a JOA, the CJFSOCC commander may establish a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to synchronize, deconflict, and coordinate operations with conventional forces. The SOCCE will normally collocate with the appropriate-level conventional force HQ (maritime or land), and may exercise control of affected SOF." The ISAF SOF command, control and coordination element is being restructured with the intent of unifying NATO and U.S. forces into a CJFSOCC in accordance with the above definition.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 3–5.

After the uncertain start amid the downsizing of the HDF, the 34th SF Battalion that represents the Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) capacity seems to be on track, although *the consolidation of this capacity* may prove to be even more challenging than the creation itself.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This thesis hopes to guide the construction of a permanent permissive environment for HUNSF development and deployment. The major causes for the current rather restrictive environment for HUNSF development and upkeep will be determined and analyzed; then the implied, and more important, issue will be addressed: *What would a permissive environment look like and how can it be created?* The ultimate goal of the current study is to highlight the utility of a special operations capability for the HDF and, thereby, enhance Hungary's capacity to pursue its national and allied interests more effectively—acknowledging that the former is yet to be formalized as a clear national strategy.

In an era that was characterized by force reduction, HUNSF emerged as a bottom-up type capability with all the accompanying advantages and challenges. The 34th SF Battalion enjoyed considerable freedom in the process of creating its organization and forming the culture associated with it. Until recently, HUNSF also had substantial and direct access to otherwise scarce resources to facilitate the formation of the 34th SF Battalion. These traits, however, came with a price.

The founding fathers of HUNSF were preoccupied solely with the tremendous task of establishing a new unit. The founders' attention was also focused on the shaping of a certain fraction—some very influential sponsors—of the strategic political and military environment. On the latter, HUNSF, as an entirely new and unprecedented capacity, was enormously dependent for support. This largely inward-looking approach was probably both unavoidable and necessary in the initial phase of HUNSF development. Self-assertion was even more reinforced by a partly self-imposed protective secrecy that generally tends to surround such forces. The very secrecy and introspective attitude that

helped facilitate and protect the birth of the unit, however, seems to have caused some adverse consequences due to Hungary's military and political leadership's general lack of understanding about SOF and special operations.

Special operations, their military and political utility, and discrete mission are inadequately understood in the HDF. Even the relatively small Hungarian SOF-community tends to disagree on these fundamental issues. It is not surprising then that the Hungarian special forces growth appears to have been met with skepticism and, sometimes, outright hostility from the larger military. Some of these concerns are almost certainly unavoidable and universal rather than HUNSF-specific. Nevertheless, HUNSF's relative isolation and the skepticism directed at it seem to prove just how critical is the attitude stakeholders possess about HUNSF's utility in the preservation, development and deployment of HUNSF. On the other hand, HUNSF's attitude toward its immediate operating environment is of equal importance.

C. HYPOTHESES

To answer the above-stated main research question regarding the major causes for the current, rather restrictive environment for HUNSF development, two hypotheses have been developed. The first concerns the exposure of non-SF personnel to SF and special operations, and the second relates to these two groups' preferences in military organizational values. The first hypothesis captures the extent to which non-SF HDF personnel are exposed to HUNSF from an operational, educational and organizational point of view. The second assumption describes the level of consistency in the non-SF HDF personnel's military organizational values and the ones they assign to HUNSF.

The first hypothesis assumes that the relevant HDF personnel's operational, educational and organizational exposure to HUNSF and special operations has a positive effect on the permissiveness of the bureaucratic environment in which HUNSF operates. The hypothesis also presumes that both the HDF's and HUNSF's relative attitude towards one another becomes more

favorable, given that they increasingly interact with each other. It is also presumed that this interaction increases HUNSF's perceived (military) utility.

The second hypothesis concerns military organizational values. The assumption is that the more overlapped the military organizational traits are between the HDF and HUNSF, the more favorable the abovementioned dependent variables become for HUNSF development and upkeep. Absolutely no alignment, from HUNSF's perspective, means slight or nil chances for cooperation, whereas a closer alignment indicates that the bureaucratic environment is potentially receptive.

Of the individual independent variables, operational exposure concerns the operational (combat theatre) experience of the relevant HDF personnel. The assumption is that the more such experience individuals accumulate, especially when it includes working with national or other SOF, the more likely they are to develop a positive attitude toward, and a general understanding of, HUNSF.




Table 1. Simplified model of variables and causal mechanism

The educational segment of the same independent variable is presumed to have the same causal mechanism. Since special operations and special forces are recent virtues of the Hungarian military, the present strategic decision makers, and those who prepare and assist decisions on the strategic and operational level, are neither well educated nor particularly familiar with special forces and special operations. Whereas this statement is not intended to be offensive, it is assumed that the information this group possesses about SOF in general, and SF in particular, is often fractious, distorted, and superficial. Until the time when HUNSF becomes adequately established and represented in the HDF, and the latter gains practical experience through exposure to HUNSF, *education and perception management will be key in gaining at least the passive support of the conventional military and the active support of at least some of the politico-military stakeholders, decision makers and managers.* HUNSF must bring itself into a position where it can provide advice for the strategic decision makers and SOF education for the operational management structure.

The other set of independent variables stresses the importance and probable effect of organizational values and cultures. The hypothetical model supposes that the more closely aligned the general military organizational values are to those that the conventional military believes to be the values of HUNSF, the more favorably the former sees HUNSF in terms of the dependent variables depicted in Table 1. This causation is presumed to create a more permissive environment for HUNSF.

HUNSF's current organizational culture and its assumed despise of the conventional military, along with its perceived or actual elitism,⁷ are believed to feed the skepticism of the Hungarian military towards HUNSF. This theory is addressed in a survey that was conducted as an element of this thesis research.

⁷ In the context of this paper, the phrase elitism refers to the expressed conviction of individual members or groups of HUNSF that those individuals or groups, or the cause they stand for, deserve a favored treatment compared to the other branches of the military by the virtue of their perceived superiority in intellect, training, equipment, experience, appearance, etc. This definition is based on The Free Dictionary, Elitism, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/elitism> (accessed February 3, 2010).

The background of the hypothesis is that the 34th SF Battalion was created on the base of a conventional, though “elite regular,” unit. The personnel of that unit also provided the majority of the personnel for the 34th SF Battalion and, even though the fluctuation rate has been considerable, the organizational culture has been continuous in this regard. The struggle to have a sufficient number of operators, political and military sponsors, and sufficient resources to develop the new unit, along with the dubious quality of the assessment and selection of personnel, seem to have resulted in HUNSF’s perceived or actual elitist attitude in lieu of ethos. This attitude is thought to have been the major source of resentment in the conventional military toward HUNSF.

The resentment of HUNSF by the conventional military has been holding back the full development of a special operations capability for Hungary. This dislike, however, might well be mitigated by increased exposure of HUNSF to HDF, extensive inter-branch cooperation and turning the current SF model into a broader SOF capacity (“SOFization”). The inward-looking organizational culture and the self-defined special status need to be balanced out with the concept of profession, “where the conduct of [the organization’s] members is importantly influenced by an external reference group of fellow specialists who prescribe training, evaluate practice, and set standards.”⁸ Since HUNSF development has largely been one-sided from the outset (focused on merely the tactical level capacity), SOF-trained facilitators are almost entirely missing at the operational and strategic level. The selection, training and education of such personnel are of key concern. Bureaucratic allies must be sought out and educated that a SOF capacity is crucial in today’s threat environment and will be a valued partner with the conventional force.

This “liaison” program needs to enjoy the full consent of HUNSF and other potential SOF elements in order to build the necessary rapport for these “fellow specialist.” The role of such a supportive group in higher headquarters is vital

⁸ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 149.

especially until the current HUNSF is turned into a special operations capacity that can provide qualified personnel at the operational and strategic levels in sufficient numbers. The importance of such “SOF bureaucrats” will not be lessened by the SOFization of the current HUNSF, but the dependence on them will somewhat decrease.

The development of HUNSF also highlights differences between the organizational cultures of the Special Forces in general and the conventional military. The subsequent disagreement on preferences create tensions that result in a less permissive environment for HUNSF development. The HDF has been undergoing significant modernization and a new military culture is most encouraged. The desired new military culture, that emphasizes a different approach to organizational culture by stressing effectiveness and preferring outcomes to outputs for instance,⁹ is more easily advanced within HUNSF. This is due to the facts that the size of HUNSF is substantially smaller than that of the conventional military and HUNSF began as a movement and retained some of the movement-like characteristics to date. Additionally, HUNSF intends to recruit personnel with a distinct mindset. If we add these to SF’s general “obsession” with efficiency and outcomes vs. the military bureaucracy’s perfectly reasonable fascination with process and outputs, the tension between organizational cultures is seemingly inescapable.

D. TARGET AUDIENCE

The dedication, boldness, innovativeness and, at times, stubbornness of the founders gave birth to the HDF 34th Special Forces Battalion—the special forces capacity on the tactical level. In the process, however, HUNSF has become too isolated from the environment in which it exists. HUNSF is, to some extent, a “legal alien,” as HUNSF has failed to adequately appreciate and completely adapt to its immediate domestic environment: the Hungarian Defense

⁹ László Lakatos, "A Magyar Honvédség markáns változásai és jövője (The remarkable changes and the future of the HDF)," *Új Honvédségi Szemle* (HM Zrínyi Kommunikációs Szolgáltató Kht. Médiaigazgatósága) LXI, no. 2007/5 (2007).

Forces. For this force to become a “legal resident,” a strategic asset for the HDF and the state, HUNSF and everyone associated with it need to adapt to and become an integral part of the immediate environment, the often-despised conventional military, while retaining its unique characteristics in the process.

The transformation from what the *current HUNSF considers SF* to what is considered SOF will require some change in the paradigm and organizational culture that characterizes HUNSF. HUNSF, the 34th SF Battalion and those associated with HUNSF development, need to appreciate that the divide between conventional and unconventional thinking is that the latter can make the best use of any, not particularly accommodating, operating environment *without turning that environment against self*—and this ability is by no means limited to combat operations.

To paraphrase Mao, HUNSF must move in the conventional bureaucratic environment as a fish swims in the sea. The Hungarian Defense Forces, the Joint Force Command and the Ministry of Defense are the chain of command and represent the immediate domestic operating environment for HUNSF. Appreciating this fact, rather than ignoring it, shaping the bureaucratic (command and control) relations and educating one another on issues that the other party is, for whatever reason, unfamiliar with is the constructive way forward for both HUNSF and HDF. Fighting the conventional bureaucracy instead of understanding and shaping it and failing to adapt would be very orthodox and, therefore, unacceptable from HUNSF as an unconventional asset. Resisting the benefits of having a highly capable special operations force would be an equally counterproductive approach by the Hungarian Defense Forces. Thinking that the parties concerned are likely to willingly engage in cooperation, initiate and implement certain (organizational) changes and appreciate one another just for the beauty of it is most likely a delusion. Personal and organizational incentives need to be provided and channeled through the HDF's command and control relationships—though not necessarily through the ones that are currently in place. Therefore, the desired target audience of this study is chiefly what

Mintzberg would call the middle line and the strategic apex¹⁰ of the Joint Force Command and the Ministry of Defense, as well as the so-called SOF community, since the latter is just as much “guilty of ignorance” as they like to think “conventional bureaucracy” is.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The thesis utilizes empirical research, historical examples, and organizational design theory. Historical examples are used to describe the stages of SOF development to identify the most likely difficulties HUNSOF is likely to face or has already gone through. Historical examples are also intended to highlight the possible adverse effects of a less than optimal operating environment for SOF. Basic organizational design theory is used to understand how the operating environment of a bureaucracy influences the appropriateness of a structure and to draw attention to the built-in limitations of any bureaucratic organization.

The data that have been collected via empirical research will be explained and analyzed by both statistical and qualitative methods in order to address the applicability of the hypotheses. The goal of the analysis is also to identify the most significant factors that, if addressed adequately, can realistically contribute to a more permissive operating environment for HUNSF, both in terms of its development and employment.

¹⁰ Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 3.

II. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

The relevant results of the empirical research that was conducted as part of this research effort show that there is little agreement on just what special forces and special operations are and what differentiates them from other forces. Additionally, in her book on U.S. Special Forces evolution, Marquis notes that “[t]he American military has traditionally been disdainful of anything considered elite or special.”¹¹ Since the empirical research indicates similar trends in the HDF, the issue of “specialness” and the basics of special operations and special forces are described in this chapter.

A. WHAT MAKES SPECIAL FORCES SPECIAL?

There are several schools of thought for the definition of both special forces and special operations. Marquis stresses that a “conventional commander—understandably—is often offended and even outraged” when he is “faced with the individualistic, rank-unconscious, questioning special operator [...]”¹² Understanding that such occasions cannot be completely eliminated and the criteria for special forces are not universal, as they can and do change country by country with varying degree of overlap, there are explicit traits that make special operators and special operations special.

Even though *special* is a relative term and, as such, needs to be understood within a certain context, the distinction between special and non-special appears to be far too simple to make in terms of military forces: Anyone who passes the Special Forces Assessment criteria, meets the objective standards for selection,¹³ and who successfully completes the training

¹¹ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4.

¹² Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4.

¹³ Assessment concerns personal traits, whereas selection generally focuses on physical attributes like fitness, stamina, etc.

requirements set forth by Special Forces is considered *special*. Whether this special status achieves external recognition is contingent, not only on facts, but on the perceptions of the “non-specials.” Simply put, the more *demanding* and the more *appreciated* the *objective standards* for selection, assessment and training, the more legitimate the distinction between those who have met the requirements and those who have not or have not even tried.

Since the legitimacy of special forces and their members is both internal and external, the latter requires the standards of the selection, assessment and training process to be appreciated by the external stakeholders. This audience must also be under the impression that the standards are applied fairly, regardless of age, gender, military rank or position, etc. The relevance of external stakeholders’ perceptions may vary, as it is probably less of a concern in militaries where Special Forces have a decent amount of autonomy and a proven track record within the military forces.¹⁴ Where this autonomy and reputation is non-existent or negligible, the external stakeholders’ attitude toward Special Forces is of significant importance. Such is the case with HUNSF.

In summation, there is, or there can be, a distinct divide between special forces and non-special forces soldiers, though for the special status to be considered legitimate—or achieved as sociology puts it, as opposed to self-declared or ascribed—this status must have both internal and external legitimacy. The term *special*, nonetheless, seems to be most meaningful from the perspective of the individuals who make up Special Forces. Although those individuals matter most when it comes to Special Forces, one also ought to be concerned with the tasks that group performs as an organization.

¹⁴ Autonomy is understood here based on Selznick’s definition: “a condition of independence sufficient to permit a group to work out and maintain a distinctive identity.” The implication is that the given group has sufficient leverage, representation, access to resources, etc.

Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* in James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 182.

B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS VS. CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Amid the current major military engagements where the enemy refuses to fight in accordance with Clausewitz's principles and the traditional military manuals' regulations, conventional operations and conventional mindset tend to appear in an ever-negative context. "Conventional" seems to have become a synonym for rigid, ineffective and unable to adapt, whereas special operations often appear as the Silver Bullet. This observation is, however, overly simplistic. These forces are meant to perform different tasks due to skill sets not widely held in the conventional force. Whether they perform them well is independent from the labeling of the forces.

1. Popular False Perceptions of Special Operations

Porkoláb and Bári, in their NPS thesis, noted that—based on the U.S. Special Operations Command's definition for special operations—"SF are special because they have unique equipment and conduct tasks that exceed the routine capabilities of General Purpose Forces (the tasks and methods being, by implication, conventional)."¹⁵ While this is far from what the two authors came up with as conclusion, this notion of special operations being the net result of better hardware and enhanced training is extremely popular and it is also frequently used to denounce the legitimacy of special forces and special operations.¹⁶

Another popular view of special operations can be summarized by what Vice Admiral William H. McRaven¹⁷ emphasizes in his book titled *Spec Ops*. McRaven declares that "[r]elative superiority is a concept key to the theory of

¹⁵ Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing national security in Hungary through the development and employment of Special Forces, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 46.

¹⁶ The argument usually goes that, provided with equal opportunity in terms of training and access to equipment, any conventional force could be considered special and able to conduct special operations. Even though there is some truth to this line of reasoning, equipment and training alone simply are not sufficient conditions for a force to be considered special.

¹⁷ Vice Admiral McRaven is a Navy SEAL and the former SOCEUR and NATO Special Operations Coordination Center commander who now commands the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command. The book referred here was based on the Master's thesis he had written as the student of the Naval Postgraduate School.

special operations” and explains that relative superiority of the attacking force is achieved when the force, that is “generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.”¹⁸ Based on numerous case studies, he also identifies the six principles of special operations that lead to relative superiority as simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose.¹⁹ The type of special operation the book misleadingly refers to as special operations per se is both an integral part and definitely the most spectacular element of special operations: direct action.

Direct action often makes headlines in the form of raids, assaults, and hostage rescues, and it is an inescapable element of special forces “dog and pony” shows; it is also a highly demanding task. It is not, however, a unique capability of special forces, nor is it a type of military operations that always falls into the category of special operations. Nonetheless, due to the very concept of relative superiority, direct action attracts considerable attention, maybe because there is a natural desire for traditional heroes in the modern era of managers.

2. Definition of Special Operations

The most comprehensive definition of special operations is probably the one provided by the United States Department of Defense Joint Publications 1-02 (as of October 31, 2009):

Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive **environments** to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic **objectives** employing military **capabilities** for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low **visibility** capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the **range** of military operations. They can be conducted **independently or in conjunction with** operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from

¹⁸ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops-Case studies in special operations warfare: Theory and practice* (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4.

¹⁹ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops-Case studies in special operations warfare: Theory and practice* (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 8–23.

conventional operations in **degree of physical and political risk**, operational **techniques**, **mode of employment**, independence from **friendly support**, and **dependence on** detailed operational **intelligence** and **indigenous assets** [emphases added].²⁰

This explanation is based on multiple levels of analysis. The definition stresses both the physical and political environment of the operations, and uses capabilities in lieu of force size. It also addresses the visibility of the operations, and extends the scope of such operations across the full spectrum of military operations including ground, air and naval operations, or the combinations of these. Furthermore, the definition is holistic in terms that it embraces the occasional inter-service, inter-agency, and multinational nature of the special operations in addition to independent operations.




Figure 1. Simplified depiction of military operation types

Special operations, more often than conventional operations, are intended to achieve a strategic objective. This means that the objective of the particular special operation is of such importance that, if achieved, the objective of the operation excessively, or positively disproportionately, contributes to the desired end state of the campaign. NATO's special operations doctrine refers to SOF's "military-strategic and operational level objectives" in a slightly less ambiguous way, as "high value objectives." These are "critical objectives that may entail high

²⁰ Defense Technical Information Center, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/s/446.html (accessed February 16, 2010).

risk but also high pay-off value.”²¹ In business terms, the return on investment is disproportionately higher than the accompanying risks.

3. Special Operations Task Set

The NATO SOF doctrine identifies four principle tasks, of which three are land operations, and several “additional activities” for the Allied Joint Special Operations Forces. The three principal land operation tasks and their subtasks tasks are:²²

- Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance
 - Environmental Reconnaissance
 - Threat Assessment
 - Target Assessment
 - Post-Strike Reconnaissance
- Direct Action
 - Raids, Ambushes and Direct Assaults
 - Terminal Guidance Operations
 - Recovery Operations
 - Precision Destruction Operations
 - Opposed Boarding Operations
 - Armed Reconnaissance
- Military Assistance²³
 - Training
 - Advising

The majority of these tasks are not unique SOF tasks; they can be conducted not only by Special Forces and Special Operations Forces, but also by conventional forces. Whether these tasks are considered special operations is

²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 1–4.

²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 2-1–2-3).

²³ The elements of the Military Assistance task are explained and compared in a subsequent section of the current chapter.

contingent on the intent of the operations: do they serve a critical military strategic or operational objective that has a high payoff value compared to the physical and political risks involved? This also means that in determining what contributes toward a special operation the task itself is of limited significance, since the vast majority of the above tasks are routinely performed by conventional forces.²⁴ Similarly, the type of force that conducts the operation is also of restricted importance; any element of the SOF task set can be conducted by special forces, but this fact itself does not necessarily make that particular military operation a special operation. Force and operation types can also be situational and form an exceptional assortment.²⁵

C. SPECIAL FORCES VS. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

In 2008, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense issued a policy paper on the Hungarian special operations forces development and employment. The policy paper classifies the Hungarian Special Operations Forces as an umbrella definition that includes:

²⁴ As Spulak notes, "as the capabilities of the conventional forces improve, they may be able to perform missions that once were the responsibility of SOF" and concludes that "special operations (and SOF) cannot be theoretically be defined in terms of specific and unchanging missions, skills or capabilities."

Robert G. Spulak, Jr., *A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF*, JSOU Report 07-07, Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2007), 4.

²⁵ In 1943, after the U.S. military had decrypted the Japanese Imperial Navy's code and intercepted a transmission with regard to the flight schedule of a troop visit planned to be conducted by Admiral Yamamoto, the mastermind of Pearl Harbor, the president of the U.S. ordered Operation Vengeance. The operation was aimed at the neutralization of the commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, whose plane was subsequently shot down in the operation. Operation Vengeance satisfies every criterion McRaven set forth for "special operations," that is, direct action. The twist is that conventional U.S. Army air assets conducted the operation. What was special about the unit involved was that it—since the unit was about to finish its lengthy tour—consisted of very capable, trained and combat experienced pilots and other service personnel, and the planes were equipped with navigations systems and drop-off fuel tanks that were non-standard aviation hardware of the time. This perspective is fully aligned with Spulak's above findings and adds to the notion that SOF and special operations must be understood in their dynamic context rather than in rigid categories.

Dr. Daniel L. Haulman, "The Yamamoto Mission," *Air Power History*, June 2003.

- Special Forces that are organized, trained and equipped to conduct non-conventional operations and achieve strategic or operational objectives by the employment of small units.²⁶
- Special infantry forces with airborne/air mobile capacities that are trained and equipped beyond the average and can both support and independently execute certain elements of special operation tasks. (Ranger type units.)
- Special operations capable forces (such as UAV, SIGINT, HUMINT, CBRN) that can support special operations and can execute certain elements of the special operations task set and, thereby, contribute to mission success.
- Special operations aviation forces.²⁷

In the HDF the line between the special forces unit and any other unit can be clearly drawn from an organizational point of view. The 34th Special Forces Battalion is an independent unit, while the other SOF elements are attached to different conventional units and are not necessarily widely considered SOF units or SOF enablers.

²⁶ The term “unconventional warfare” is deliberately avoided in the cited source and in the context of HUNSF generally speaking, as NATO does not use the term—most probably due to its highly political nature: “Activities conducted to enable resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”

David M. Witty, "The Great UW Debate," *Special Warfare* (Department of the Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School) 23, no. 2 (March–April 2010): 9–17.

²⁷ Based on the respective paragraph of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense White Paper on Special Operations Forces development and employment. Translation by the author.

Honvédelmi Minisztérium Hadművelti és Kiképzési Főosztály, "A különleges műveletek alapfogalmai, a különleges művelti erők szervezete és készenlétének szintjei (1. sz. melléklet a 1194/2008 ny. számhoz)," *A Magyar Honvédség különleges műveleti képessége alkalmazásának és fejlesztésének alapelvei (Principles for the employment and development of the HDF's special operations capacity)* (Budapest: Magyar Köztársaság Honvédelmi Minisztérium, July 28, 2008), 1.




Figure 2. Special Operations Forces in the HDF²⁸

From a capabilities point of view, the clear divide between Special Forces and other SOF is that the former solely exists to perform special operations and has the unique capacity to conduct operations that are non-conventional in their nature. From a tasks approach, based on the NATO SOF tasks set, the task that highlights the slight difference between SF and other SOF best is the advisory task under Military Assistance—and there is a connection between this unique task and the distinctive unconventional capability.

D. SPECIAL FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL MINDSET

The Military Assistance task, according to the NATO SOF doctrine, breaks down into Training and Advising sub-tasks. The doctrine's Training description emphasizes the improvement of tactical level "individual, leader and organizational *skills* [emphasis added]."²⁹ The Advising narrative is counter-

²⁸ Figure 2 is a graphic depiction of the Hungarian SOF capacity as described in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense's White Paper on Special Operations Forces development and employment.

Honvédelmi Minisztérium Hadművelti és Kiképzési Főosztály, "A különleges műveletek alapfogalmai, a különleges művelti erők szervezete és készenlétének szintjei (1. sz. melléklet a 1194/2008 nyt. számhoz)," *A Magyar Honvédség különleges műveleti képessége alkalmazásának és fejlesztésének alapelvei (Principles for the employment and development of the HDF's special operations capacity)* (Budapest: Magyar Köztársaság Honvédelmi Minisztérium, July 28, 2008), 1.

²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 2–3.

insurgency focused on the tactical level and underlines the strengthening of “population security by providing *active participation* in *tactical* operations conducted by H[ost] N[ation] military units [emphasis added].”³⁰ These explanations, though probably intentionally vague as the results of the member nations’ compromise, are somewhat helpful in identifying the divide between training and advising.

Training is a both prescriptive and descriptive activity, as it is aimed to improve skills based on standard (operating) procedures in a reasonably isolated environment that is physically separated from the fields where those skills will be put to work. Every military unit conducts training and dedicated trainers are taught methodologies that increase the *efficiency* of the training *process*.

Advising, on the other hand, is less clear-cut. Compared to training, advising takes place where “things happen,” be it combat or other activity, and not in an isolated training environment. Based on a non-military definition, advising is a *developmental process* that assists the advisees in the development and realization of *their goals*. Advising is also a *decision-making process* by which the advisees realize *their maximum potential* through communication and information exchanges. The advising process is the *responsibility of both the advisor and the advisee* where the advisor serves as a *facilitator of communication and coordinator of progress review*.³¹

³⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5* (NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 2–3.

³¹ “Academic advising is a developmental process which assists students in the clarification of their life/career goals and in the development of educational plans for the realization of these goals. It is a decision-making process by which students realize their maximum educational potential through communication and information exchanges with an advisor; it is ongoing, multifaceted, and the responsibility of both student and advisor. The advisor serves as a facilitator of communication, a coordinator of learning experiences through course and career planning and academic progress review, and an agent of referral to other campus agencies as necessary.”

Tuskegee University, *Academic Advising Definition*, <http://www.tuskegee.edu/Global/story.asp?S=6925874> (accessed February 25, 2010).

There is much more to advising than what can be described within the limits of this thesis and, in practice, training and advising are likely to have some overlap. One of the fundamental differences between training and advising is that the former intends to *perfect the application of processes*, while the latter's goal is to *assist and bring about the maximum potential* of the advisees to make adequate and appropriate judgments that are based on the advisees' personality and experience. Training and advising, then, differ in their goals and the methods by which those goals are achieved. Training is more straightforward and advising is somewhat indirect. Moreover, advisers, unlike trainers, cannot be mass produced, partly due to the traits required to be successful in the application of training and advising.

Some of the traits required for military advisory are maturity (not in terms of age), empathy (but not sympathy), patience, humbleness (but not submissiveness), ability to intuitively read situations, cultures and people, and comprehend how those people read the advisor, and ability to take an indirect approach. These attributes are by no means exclusive; nevertheless, they suggest that *there are some unorthodox requirements for Special Forces to be able to conduct non-conventional operations* as described in the Hungarian MoD's White Paper.

Whereas the capability to conduct non-conventional operations is adequately addressed by Porkoláb and Bári, the often-heard need for an unconventional mindset or thinking is less explored.³² The preface of an earlier Hungarian Land Forces tactics manual, issued in the mid-1990s, pointed out that the procedures discussed in the manual were to be employed in a creative way. This was quite a departure from the previous order-oriented approach, where the *what* and the *how* used to be equally prescribed—leaving virtually no room for consideration or judgment to the commanders. The manual, however, failed to

³² Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, *Enhancing national security in Hungary through the development and employment of Special Forces*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 13–22, 51, 116.

make any reference to the so-called Auftragstaktik that stresses the importance of the commander's intent (*what*) and leaves considerable room for maneuver to the subordinate commander in terms of *how* he is going to achieve that intent. Although this principle is much desired in the HDF,^{33 34} mission command is not actually represented as an overarching leadership principle.³⁵

The Auftragstaktik principle is undoubtedly present in HUNSF, though there is more to the required unconventional mindset. Unconventional thinking also means not taking anything by face value and seeking out the intention of the rules rather than blindly apply them, and occasionally even questioning authority. Thinking unconventionally means *seeing around the corner* where other people see walls and being innovative and adaptive *as the rule and not the exception*, while remaining moral or, at worst, amoral, but never immoral.³⁶

Spulak emphasizes seemingly other traits for SOF, and intentionally avoids using the term *unconventional*. He states that “the distributions of attributes for SOF personnel are different for the military [...] because there is a minimum standard against which these personnel were selected.” He adds that it is not the physical but the “mental and psychological attributes” that “create three fundamental qualities of SOF.”³⁷ These Spulak summarized as “SOF are elite

³³ László Lakatos, "A Magyar Honvédség markáns változásai és jövője (The remarkable changes and the future of the HDF)," *Új Honvédségi Szemle* (HM Zrínyi Kommunikációs Szolgáltató Kht. Médiaigazgatósága) LXI, no. 2007/5 (2007).

³⁴ Lieutenant General Tibor Benkő, *Magyar Honvédség Összahaderőnemi Parancsnokság (Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command)*, https://www.parbeszed.hm.gov.hu/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=246&parentname=CommunityPage&parentid=3&mode=2&in_hi_userid=339145&cached=true (accessed March 9, 2010).

³⁵ Péter Lippai, *Chances and Limits of Mission Command*, PhD Dissertation, Hadtudományi Iskola, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University (Budapest: Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, 2009), 11–13.

³⁶ This last condition is of worth. Without morality added, one could argue that “tax optimization,” a “national sport” in many countries, is an excellent example of unconventional thinking if no rules are broken. These notions of conventional vs. unconventional thinking were strongly influenced by Professor Anna Simons’ Military Advisor class at the Naval Postgraduate School in AY2010/1, though the opinions and ideas expressed here are solely the author’s responsibility.

³⁷ Robert G. Spulak, Jr., *A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF*, JSOU Report 07-07, Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2007), 39.

warriors, creative and flexible,” who directly implement the strategy in war, are able to adapt to the changing situations of their environment, and “have a much larger range of capabilities and are more independent of the other military forces than conventional units.”³⁸

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, the personal and organizational traits, organizational task sets, the objectives and their desired effects have been described to characterize special operations, SOF and Special Forces. Acknowledging that more distinctions can be made depending on the level of analysis, these discussed features are considered the most significant, since they also address the most popular misunderstandings regarding special operations, Special Forces, SOF and their utility.

On the individual level, the main difference between special and other forces is the unconventional mindset required for every single SF service member. This does not mean that people with an unconventional mindset can only be found in special forces and conventional soldiers are “in-the-box-thinkers,” or there is a difference in quality or usefulness between the two forces. It means that Special Forces operators, as a rule, need to have an unorthodox mindset to be successful in their tasks, whereas unconventionality is not a prerequisite for conducting successful conventional operations.

From an organizational task set and their desired effects point of view, there is a certain overlap between special operations and conventional tasks. What stands out as a truly unique special forces task is the advisory role whose prerequisite is unconventionality or, as Spulak states, unique distribution of “mental and psychological attributes.” The other SOF tasks amount to special operations only if they serve a critical military strategic or operational objective that has a high payoff value compared to the physical and political risks involved,

³⁸ Robert G. Spulak, Jr., *A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF*, JSOU Report 07-07, Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2007), 39.

and there is no readily available conventional asset to achieve that objective. What follows is that, in theory, conventional forces can conduct certain SOF tasks and SOF can equally be employed to achieve non-SOF objectives. The one and only field where there is a definite distinction between SF and conventional forces is the former's unique personal and organizational attributes.

III. SPECIAL FORCES EVOLUTION: HISTORICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

A. COMMON TRAITS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN SPECIAL FORCES

In *Commandos and Politicians*, Eliot A. Cohen—through the study of British, Israeli, French and U.S. elite military units’ as well as Otto Skorzeny’s Friedenthalers’ historic background, origins and actions since World War II—examines the circumstances of the birth, evolution and utility of elite units. Cohen also carefully analyses the various costs associated with the existence and actions of what he labels as elite units.³⁹

Cohen dedicates special attention to “[t]he most interesting political aspects of elite units” that “appear at their birth and in their early struggles with bureaucratic predators.”⁴⁰ According to Cohen’s argument, the emergence of a perceived national security threat that was manifested in a military need—to conduct commando type operations and unconventional warfare—and the presence of skilled and dedicated military leaders along with their respective influential sponsor’s “romantic image of war” led to the establishment of the elite units.⁴¹ The author, clearly not in particular favor of such units, sees his assessment justified by the fact that a decline in either the threat level or the sponsors’ support, or both, historically resulted in the disbandment of elite units.

³⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians-Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978).

⁴⁰ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians-Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 27.

⁴¹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians-Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 35.

Such was the case with the British SAS, the Israeli Palmach, the Underwater Demolition Teams and the Office of Strategic Services.⁴²

The formation of the officially non-existent 1st Special Forces Detachment—Delta (1st SFD-D) is another example of both the challenges and the stages of special forces evolution. The establishment of 1st SFD-D, as described by its founder Charlie Beckwith, required the successful examples of units with similar mission, like the British SAS and the German GSG9, and tremendous amount of dedication from those who thought such capacity was necessary in the U.S. military. More importantly, *the second stage of Delta's evolution, following its birth, needed a well thought-out strategy to recruit allies within the military and the political sphere.* These allies could then *convince other influential supporters and decision makers in order to overcome the bureaucracy's resistance and the refusal of those who felt their interests and authority threatened by the new unit.* Moreover, “divine intervention,” in the form of the Mogadishu hijacking incident in 1977, changed the perceptions with regard to the security environment and added the President to the group of supporters as the most influential sponsor.⁴³

The history of the U.S. Army Special Forces (USASF) is also characterized by ups and downs. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established during the second World War by William “Wild Bill” Donovan’s dedication and the support Franklin D. Roosevelt, a friend and former classmate, could provide. After the war, the OSS, along with other special operations forces,

⁴² Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 10.

Another example is the U.S.-Canadian 1st Special Service Force (1st SSF). Created during World War II and intended primarily for winter warfare in Europe, it did not even live long enough to experience the challenges other special units faced in their early years. The 1st SSF was mostly employed as elite infantry before it was disbanded well before the end of the war due to the extremely heavy losses it sustained during operations in Italy and France.

Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, *Devil's Brigade*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil%27s_Brigade (accessed March 3, 2010).

⁴³ Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, *Delta Force* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1985).

was nearly eliminated. The reappearance in the form of U.S. Army Special Forces was triggered by “John F. Kennedy’s call” in the 1950s amid the deteriorating political and military situation in Southeast Asia.⁴⁴ Though Kennedy took special interest in the U.S. Special Forces, the force was largely discredited in the Vietnam War and “there was an approximately 70 percent reduction in the manning of the special operations forces and a 95 percent reduction in funding.”⁴⁵

The birth of USASF was, then, characterized by a recent historic example, the expertise of mainly ex-OSS personnel, the explicit support of a very influential sponsor, and an emerging security threat. Although the U.S. Special Operations Forces regained significance in the 1980s, it was not until a series of failures in operations when U.S. SOF finally entered the second stage of its evolution and secured a permanent seat at the table of the “older siblings.” This occurred via a legislative change that concerned the bureaucratic embeddedness of U.S. SOF.

The legislative reform of the highest-level military structure was initiated from within, as most military decision makers were aware of the issues discovered by the Brehm Report,⁴⁶ but service and individual career interest as well as the seemingly impossible task and the natural resistance of bureaucracies toward change discouraged the idea.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4.

⁴⁵ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 58.

⁴⁶ “In 1981, General Jones asked William Brehm, a former Pentagon official, to lead a study evaluating the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jones had become frustrated with the Joint Chiefs’ ineffectiveness. Requiring unanimity among the group’s five members to reach a decision, the Joint Chiefs tended to resort to embracing the least common denominator just to get some sort of agreement. Brehm’s report came back eleven months later, recommending substantial, and likely painful, reform to the Joint Chiefs system.”

“Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction,” *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, www.sigir.mil/applyinghardlessons/pdf/Goldwater-Nichols.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010).

⁴⁷ James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (A & M University Press, 2002).

The environment in which General Jones, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiated the legislative and organizational changes was historically the most permissive. The recent military fiascos or near fiascos (Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, the SS Mayaguez incident in Cambodia, USS Pueblo incident near North Korea and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada) and the public's awareness of those created a "something needs to be done" atmosphere within the highest levels of U.S. government. However, the fact that General Jones was nearing the end of his term and if he had gotten fired would have done little harm to his career also might have played a role in his boldness to carry out the plan.

General Jones's attempt to initiate the changes from within, and the fact that he hired prominent retired general officers to conduct the primary research that was manifested in the Brehm Report, also proved to be a wise decision. When the "from within" attempt failed, due to the excellent design used to conduct the research, the most influential decision makers' attitudes had already been mapped. Moreover, the Brehm Report also served as the basis of the subsequent Goldwater-Nichols Act that introduced "institutional sponsorship" for U.S. SOF, and mitigated the problems arising from individual sponsorship.⁴⁸

Today, in the third stage of its evolution, U.S. SOF faces different kinds of challenges that can also have some relevance for HUNSF. Marquis warns of the threat that arises from SOF becoming a too service-like entity and, thereby, losing much of the traits that make it capable of conducting special operations.⁴⁹ Her concerns are primarily organizational in nature, since a military service is typically a divisionally structured bureaucracy,⁵⁰ or what Wilson

⁴⁸ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 298.

⁴⁹ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 258–261.

⁵⁰ Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January–February 1981, 8–9.

considers a procedural organization.⁵¹ SOF, alternatively and partly due to its comparatively smaller size and task set, is more of a combination of a missionary organization and an operating adhocracy,⁵² or what Wilson refers to as a craft and coping organization.⁵³

In another view of SOF's future, Adams suggests an Unconventional Operations Force (UOF) that would leave the more conventional tasks, such as direct actions and special reconnaissance, to the Navy SEALs, the Rangers and the conventional forces. The UOF would retain the missions or tasks that are not only special "because they are done at a very high level of proficiency and often in very difficult circumstances," but are truly unique due to the fact that they are "not part of the conventional warfighting." The proposed UOF would consist of the Special Forces, Civic Actions and Psychological Operations components of SOF.⁵⁴

Similarly, in their very recent NPS thesis, a group of U.S. authors calls for an Irregular Warfare Command that "will enable the Department of Defense (DoD) to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment, while maintaining its conventional capabilities."⁵⁵ Accordingly, "the DoD should establish a separate organization, incorporating existing capabilities, focused on conducting operations within" the Irregular Warfare environment.⁵⁶ The proposed IW Command would encompass the

⁵¹ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 163–164.

⁵² Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 10–11.

⁵³ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 165–171.

⁵⁴ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 304.

⁵⁵ David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver and Scott C. White, *Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 99, v.

⁵⁶ David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver and Scott C. White, *Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 67.

forces and capabilities Adam described in his scheme with the addition of the Marine Special Operations Advisory Group.⁵⁷

The above are clear signs of the third phase of SOF evolution, when the goal of SOF's struggle shifts from sheer survival and growth to the preservation of distinct organizational values, the identity of Special Forces, and the redefinition of tasks. The major concern in the second stage of SOF evolution is exactly the advancement of those distinct organizational values. As trivial as it may well sound, the prerequisite for discrete organizational values is the existence of a fully functioning, distinctive organization—an open system, with sub-systems on the tactical, operational and strategic level. One of the challenges HUNSF faces in its second stage of evolution is precisely the establishment of this fully functional and distinctive organization that is also reasonably integrated into the bigger HDF realm.

B. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

1. Two Sets of Missions

The organizational distinctiveness between SOF and other forces is noticeable not only in those forces' tactical organizations, but also in their management structures, or, in military terms, their command and control arrangements. Yet, the dissimilarities are not the consequences of the “conventional” or “special” labels, but the inherent characteristics of these forces' management structures: their missions, goals, tasks and the environment in which the organization exists.

In *Notes on Low-intensity Warfare*, Luttwak differentiates between attrition based and relational-maneuver based warfare, and asserts that “the closer they are to the theoretical extreme of pure attrition, the more armed forces tend to be focused on their own internal administration and operations, being

⁵⁷ David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver and Scott C. White, *Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 68.

correspondingly less responsive to the external environment [...]” in order to “to maximize process efficiencies” of the attrition that enables victory on the battlefield. The mission and goals of the conventional forces determine the structural arrangements, because

a well-managed armed force of this kind cannot logically be adaptive to the external environment; instead it should strive to develop an optimal set of organizational formats, methods, and tactics which are then to be applied whenever possible with the least modification, because any modification must be suboptimal.⁵⁸

On the other hand, Luttwak notes that the relational-maneuver oriented warfare needs to be more conscious and appreciative of its environment, since for such warfare “victory is to be obtained by identifying the specific weaknesses of the particular enemy and then reconfiguring one's own capabilities to exploit those weaknesses.” This requires thorough understanding of and flexible adaptation to the operating environment. Since adaptation necessitates institutionalized and frequent changes,

armed forces with a high relational-maneuver content cannot usually maximize process efficiencies and cannot logically develop optimal organizational formats, methods, and tactics. Instead each must be relational, i.e. reconfigured ad hoc [...].⁵⁹

Whereas Luttwak makes the very legitimate point that “there is, of course, no inherent virtue to either attrition or relational maneuver”⁶⁰ and one cannot possibly maintain that conventional forces are on the one end of the spectrum with special forces on the other, differing missions and goals require distinct organizational structures.

⁵⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," *Parameters* (U.S. Army War College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 13.

⁵⁹ Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," *Parameters* (U.S. Army War College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 13.

⁶⁰ Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," *Parameters* (U.S. Army War College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 13.

2. Characteristics of Organizations

Bureaucracies, to include military organizations, are rich sources of frustration. This has many roots, as organizations are designed to perform certain tasks in a particular environment. Effective organizations perform their core tasks well and others not so well: they come with limitations by design depending on their type.

Perhaps the most common typology of organizations is the one compiled by Mintzberg. According to this theory, organizations can be categorized as simple configuration/structure, machine bureaucracy, adhocracy/innovative organization, professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form and idealistic/missionary organizations.⁶¹ These structures are not necessarily represented in a clear-cut way. They can create hybrids; especially, since organizations have a life cycle and the stages thereof may require different structures.

The elements that build up these structures are common with the emphasis shifting, depending on the particular organization. These elements are depicted in Figure 3. The strategic apex is the top management or the executives, the operating core performs the basic work/production within the organization, the managers are the middle line between the strategic apex and the operating core, and there are two additional support elements. The technostructure is to “design systems concerned with the formal planning and control of the work,” while the support staff provides “indirect services to the rest of the organization—everything from the cafeteria and the mail room to the public relations department and legal counsel.”⁶²

⁶¹ Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January–February 1981, 4–5.

⁶² Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January–February 1981, 3.




Figure 3. Mintzberg's five basic parts of organizations⁶³

As both Luttwak and Mintzberg asserts, an organization is successful in achieving its stated purpose if it fits in to its environment. The level of uncertainty in the task environment determines the type of organization that is the best fit given the particular environment and task set. Environmental uncertainty derives from two factors: stability and complexity. The more rapidly changes occur in the task environment, the less stable it becomes. Similarly, the number and variety of external elements relevant to the problems the organization faces determines the complexity of the task environment. A few and independent issues result in a simple environment, whereas many and interconnected problems create complexity.⁶⁴

⁶³ Figure 3 is based on Mintzberg's description of the five basic parts. The figure here is a schematic depiction of a machine bureaucracy.

Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 3.

⁶⁴ Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizations Design for Special Operations," *Mintzberg's "Structures in Fives"* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School).




Figure 4. Four of Mintzberg's structures and their major characteristics and respective environments (after Erik Jansen)⁶⁵

The major structures described herein and depicted in Figure 4 often overlap, and a certain structure can occasionally host another within its organization. Since the structures are meant to serve dissimilar goals, such symbiosis is inevitably a rich source of conflicts. Such is the relationship between the bureaucratic structures of the HDF and HUNSF.

⁶⁵ Excerpt from: Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizations Design for Special Operations," Mintzberg's "Structures in Fives" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, AY2009/3).

3. Differences by Design

As Wilson asserts, “culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual;” it is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”⁶⁶ The more clearly and precisely the “central tasks,” the mission, of an organization are defined, the more clear-cut the culture. “If all or most members agree as to what the organization’s central tasks are and how they should be performed, then the organization has a single culture.”⁶⁷ Since the HDF is a bureaucracy with a variety of tasks to perform, a single culture is difficult to develop and maintain. This is, however, not the case with HUNSF.

HUNSF began as a missionary organization that was built around a single ethos: the creation of the special forces capacity in the HDF. Today, in terms of the bureaucratic life cycle depicted in Table 2, HUNSF is between the second (collectivity) and third stage (formalization), while the HDF, as a long-standing organization with a variety of tasks, is in the fourth cycle of its life (elaboration). Even though such categorization has no merit in itself, the traits that accompany the stages, due to conflicting preferences, help determine the relationship between HUNSF and the HDF.

Missionary organizations share many of their characteristics with (social or political) movements. A charismatic leader with an ideology recruits a like-minded group in pursuit of a single agenda. The hardcore is a “band of brothers” with a very strong commitment toward the cause. The organization must grow; therefore, they recruit, or rather select, the personnel of the organization. The organization creates its symbols, myths, traditions and rituals. Further admissions are usually subject to strict standards established by the hardcore. There is no—or only ad-hoc—functional differentiation of tasks; the span of

⁶⁶ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 91.

⁶⁷ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 93.

control is wide with the decisions made by the charismatic leader. There is virtually no formalization, and specialization is not particularly diverse; members are focused on a single mission.

	1. Entrepreneurial	2. Collectivity	3. Formalization	4. Elaboration
Characteristic	Non-bureaucratic	Pre-bureaucratic	Bureaucratic	Very bureaucratic
Structure	Informal, personality-driven	Mostly informal, some procedures	Formal procedures, division of labor, specialties added	Teamwork within bureaucracy, small-company thinking
Products/services	Single product/service	Major product/service with variations	Line of products or services	Multiple product/services lines
Reward & control system	Personal, paternalistic	Personal, contribution to success	Impersonal, formalized systems	Extensive, tailored to product and department
Innovation	By owner-manager	By employees & managers	By separate innovation group	By institutionalized research & development
Goal	Survival	Growth	Internal stability, market expansion	Reputation, complete organization
Top management style	Individualistic, entrepreneurial	Charismatic, direction-giving	Delegation with control	Team approach, attack bureaucracy

Table 2. The life cycle of organizations (after Erik Jensen)⁶⁸

Since the movement needs to grow and the bureaucracy manages the resources required for growth, HUNSF produced its own managers. With the relatively recent establishment of HUNSF's formal representation in the HDF's bureaucracy, HUNSF entered the pre-bureaucratic stage of its life cycle with adhocracy-like organizational characteristics. Continuing training and much education still play an important role. The jobs are increasingly specialized horizontally, and the organization is losing some of its movement-like characteristics, but it remains organic and innovative nonetheless. Charismatic leadership is still of significance; however, with decentralization occurring by the movement becoming institutionalized, charisma is amended with management skills that are vital in the bureaucratic structure.

⁶⁸ Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizational Design for Special Operations," *Life Cycle, Size & Bureaucracy* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, AY2009/3).

The stages of SOF evolution that were established and used in the previous section on the evolution of modern special forces, while similar to the ones described in the current table, are not identical, as the former applies solely to special forces.

Mutual adjustment, as the main characteristic of an adhocracy, does not require much formalization, but does need a short chain of command that fits the rather unstable and complex operating environment—be it the domestic “bureaucratic jungle” or the deployed HUNSF elements’ combat theatre. Moreover, adhocracies are not meant to produce outputs; there is no “product” at the end of the work process. Since formalization is very low to non-existent, adhocracies are outcome/effect focused in lieu of process.⁶⁹

As for the HDF’s bureaucracy, of Mintzberg’s structures it is closest to the divisionalized structure with strong machine bureaucracy-like characteristics. Unlike in adhocracies, jobs are both horizontally and vertically specialized and standardized procedures are the norm. The divisions, like JFC’s branches, are “tall” with the decision makers considerably distanced from the non-managers. The authority and power are centered at the top of each division/branch, which also means that non-managers are not empowered. Hence, divisions/branches are only seemingly the indicators of delegated authority in terms of decision making, as “managers at the heads of these units retain the lion’s share of the power” and the structure is even “more centralized than many functional structures where large numbers of specialists get involved in the making of important decisions.”⁷⁰ This notion of less, or more direct and timely, access to decision makers in the absence of delegated power, does make a difference in a dynamic, rapidly and unpredictably changing task environment.

⁶⁹ The JFC’s Special Operations Section provides ample examples to underline these observations. The Section was established before the HDF even had a Special Operations Policy. Formalization was virtually nonexistent prior to the foundation of the Section, and regulations with regard to HUNSF are still embryonic. Daily and longer-term issues are largely dealt with in an ad hoc manner rather than along established lines of standards. The Section Chief, with the consent of the Chief J3, has an access to the JFC Commander comparable to those of the “J-Heads.” Moreover, the tasks of the Section are mostly self-defined or directly come from the JFC Commander rather than assigned by the Chief J3, and their execution is widely coordinated through horizontal “shortcuts” to other JFC branches or MoD departments.

⁷⁰ Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 9.




Figure 5. Mintzberg's divisionalized form and its characteristics (after Erik Jansen)⁷¹

As noted above, the divisionalized structure's divisions are machine bureaucracies. Those work best in a reasonably stable and predictable task environment. The divisionalized structure was created for the very purpose of increasing the structure's flexibility and adaptability to the environment.⁷² Nevertheless, "some evidence suggests that the control systems of these structures discourages risk taking and innovation"⁷³ that are inherent to adhocracies.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Excerpt from: Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizations Design for Special Operations," *Mintzberg's "Structures in Fives"* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, AY2009/3).

⁷² Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 9.

⁷³ Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 9–10.

⁷⁴ Based on Hannah's observations, the frustrations the characteristics of a machine bureaucracy can create include: the blind application of process regardless of the circumstances ("This is what the book says!"); using the standardized procedures as an excuse for not making the effort ("I don't make the rules"); highly specialized jobs without duplication ("That's not my job but Joe's, but he's not in today."); no personal incentives to perform beyond the minimum ("Will they pay me more if I fill in for Joe today?"); centralized decisions ("I'll have to ask my boss [but he's out of the office right now.]); standardization of performance and rigidity ("This is how we always did this, why change what worked for years?").

David P. Hannah, "Understanding How Organizations Function," in *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 1-31 (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1988), 5–7.

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In summation, the first stage of special forces evolution is characterized by a previously unmatched threat in the security environment, the perceived or actual lack of military capacity to adequately address that threat, a committed and able individual with a vision of how to best cope with the threat, prominent sponsors, and other nations' example in terms of the required force.

The second phase of the evolution requires what Adams calls the *institutional sponsorship* for the new force to become reasonably established with no imminent and recurring threat to its existence.⁷⁵ This seems to require a legislative action that sets the basis for bureaucratic establishment. Such action can be implemented in a unique, politically permissive environment and facilitated by "bureaucratic guerrillas:" experienced, incentivized lobbyists and managers with the appropriate leverage, connections and expertise.⁷⁶ HUNSF is considered to be at the beginning of this second phase.

The third stage seems to occur when the conventional military, due to improvements in technology and policy, increasingly incorporates and begins to routinely execute tasks that were once special. This, along with other factors like a new challenge in the security environment, forces SOF to redefine itself, its task set and the adjoining organizational structure.

Dissimilar missions and operating environments require bureaucratic structures designed to effectively deal with the challenges that particular missions and environments present. Organizations are not meant to perform well beyond their realm of mission and environment. Their flexibility, the ability to adapt, is limited by design.

⁷⁵ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 298.

⁷⁶ Although the term seems to be widely used in the context of bureaucracies, among the relevant SOF literature it is Marquis who uses it as "the bureaucratic guerrillas who fought for SOF reform."

Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 266.

Most military organizations are divisionalized structures. Their branches or departments are machine bureaucracies or, at best, professional ones. HUNSF's present organizational structure is in the pre-bureaucratic stage of its life cycle, and that bureaucratic structure is closest to an adhocracy. An adhocracy is, by definition, innovative. The flipside of the argument is that, by design, innovation is about the only thing an adhocracy does well. Placing HUNSF's adhocracy that is in the pre-bureaucratic stage of its life in the fully developed bureaucratic structure of the HDF inevitably creates frictions due to conflicting organizational preferences. An adhocracy wants effects through innovation and adaptation, while a mature bureaucracy will struggle to apply the processes that have been developed and applied throughout the years for and by other elements of the organization. Since the evolution of HUNSF creates a complex sub-environment within the reasonably stable and simple surroundings of the HDF, the solution to the resulting organizational friction may be a unique organizational arrangement.

IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: THE ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

A. RESEARCH BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Purpose, Data Collection Methods and Means

The research data was gathered by using a survey questionnaire that was developed based on the investigator's personal experiences during his service in the JFC and his interactions with SOF and non-SOF personnel.⁷⁷ The vast majority of the actual data collection occurred in interview settings, while a smaller number of the subjects were engaged via email and completed the questionnaire on their own. All twenty-one subjects are senior HDF military staff personnel with at least ten years of active duty service. Eighty percent of the subjects had been serving between one and three years on their position at the time the data was collected, and none of them had served less than one year on their recent job.

The subjects were dispersed across the command structures' functional areas with substantial relevance to HUNSF. Functional areas such as aviation safety and aviation engineering were left out of the data collection due to their very limited interaction with HUNSF related issues. The sample also includes HUNSF personnel in staff functions with or without actual SOF or SF background.

Despite the relatively small sample, the survey is still considered to represent the intended audience, since the primary objective of the research is to analyze the *bureaucratic environment* of HUNSF in order to determine the environment's permissiveness for HUNSF's upkeep and future development as the main dependent variable. Accordingly, the following survey questions were designed to capture the subjects':

⁷⁷ The actual survey questionnaire is available in Appendix A.

- exposure to HUNSF/SOF and special operations (Questions 3, 5–7);
- perceptions about HUNSF and special operations (Questions 8,19);
- relative attitude toward HUNSF and special operations (Questions 24-27);
- military organizational values (Questions 12–16);
- perceptions about HUNSF’s attitudes (Questions 17–19, 23);
- level of understanding regarding HUNSF and special operations (Questions 9–11).

The survey questionnaire included close ended, multiple choice and scaled, as well as matrix questions. On occasion, “yes or no” type questions were combined with contingency questions. For the scaled questions, 1 through 7 scales were used with, save for two questions, no option offered for the mean (4) answer. The absolute negative (“don’t agree”) and positive (“completely agree”) options are represented by 1 and 7 respectively for the most part; deviances from this will be indicated in the course of the discussion.

2. Overall Model and the Independent and Dependent Variables

Based on the above grouping of the survey questions, five independent (IV) and four proxy dependent variables (DV) were generated.⁷⁸ The subjects’ exposure to HUNSF/SOF and special operations was further partitioned, because the different exposure types were assumed to cause distinct variance in the dependent variable through the proxy dependent variables. Therefore, operational exposure to HUNSF, SOF and/or special operations became the first independent variable based on whether the subject had been deployed to active operational theaters and if he, during the tour, had interacted with national or other special (operations) forces (Question 3).

⁷⁸ For the overall model and the proposed causal mechanism, see Table 1 in the Hypotheses section of Chapter I.

The subjects' educational exposure to SOF and special operations is the second independent variable. The relevant survey questions (Questions 5 & 6) were combined, since one of them inquired the extent (relative significance in the subjects' military education) and the other the nature (graduate, seminar, course) of the subjects' exposure to SOF education.⁷⁹

The third independent variable represents the extent of the subjects' organizational experience with HUNSF. This variable is based on the survey's seventh question that asks, on a 1 through 7 scale, about the frequency with which the subject or the branch he belongs to interacts with HUNSF related issues.

The fourth independent variable, military value alignment, is the most interesting with the expectation of significant variance on the dependent variable. This variable is created as the combination of the individual responses to questions 12 and 15. Both questions contain the same list of 39 organizational values or characteristics. The subjects were required to select ten of those in both questions. In Question 12, the subjects were to choose the values that they individually considered the most important and ideal for the military. In Question 15, they were asked to select the ones that they thought most characterized HUNSF. The goal of combining these questions was to determine the degree of congruency in terms of the subjects' actual military values and of those they associated with HUNSF.⁸⁰

The fifth independent variable is HUNSF's attitude towards the conventional military as perceived by the subjects. This variable is of special importance, since it brings HUNSF directly into the equation assuming that the way HUNSF is perceived to treat their conventional brothers also influences the environment in which HUNSF exists. The relevant question to this variable is

⁷⁹ IV2 is the combination of the pertinent individual responses from questions number five and six ($IV2 = R5 * [R6 + 1]$ where R stands for the individual responses).

⁸⁰ When the individual's two value sets are fully aligned, the sum result of the combined questions number 12 and 15 is 10, whereas nil agreement is represented by 0: $IV4 = \sum (R12/1 * R15/1) + (R12/2 * 15/2) + [\dots] (R12/39 * 15/39)$.

number eighteen where the subjects were to assess, on a 1 through 7 scale, whether they thought HUNSF disregarded the conventional military. On this scale, more means actually less in terms of the dependent variable's value (the more HUNSF is believed to disregard the conventional military, the less permissive the bureaucratic environment).

As for the other set of variables, four proxy dependent variables have been generated to assist the main dependent variable. The first such variable is the relative attitude of the subjects toward HUNSF. This was created based on the elements of the eighth question in the survey where the subjects were given statements and they had to determine, on a scale from 1 through 7, the extent to which they considered those statements applicable to HUNSF. Since there is no objective answer to those sub-questions, they indicate the subjects' attitude toward HUNSF on the given area.⁸¹

The second proxy dependent variable concerns the perceived "HUNSF ego." The assumption is that the more HUNSF is considered "high and mighty" by the relevant non-HUNSF personnel, the less cooperative the latter becomes. This variable was generated based on the responses to Question 17 in the survey.

The third proxy dependent variable concerns HUNSF's alleged relationship to regulations. The relevant survey question (Question 19) inquires about the subjects' perception on whether HUNSF follows the rules and regulations more or less often than other HDF elements—or is there no difference? The responses were scaled from 1 to 7 with the highest being the most favorable for HUNSF and also contributing to a decrease in the dependent variable's value.

⁸¹ The subject's relative attitude was determined by dividing the sum of the responses by individuals to the positive (e.g., high level of training) and the negative (e.g., despise of non-HUNSF personnel) sub-questions ($DV1 = \sum [R8/a,c,f,g+1] / [\sum R8/d,e,h+1]$).

Name of the variable	Respective survey question
<i>Independent</i>	
1. Operational exposure	3
2. Educational exposure	5,6
3. Organizational exposure	7
4. Military value alignment	12,15
5. HUNSF's attitude to the military	18
<i>Dependent</i>	
1. Relative attitude to SF	8/a,c,d,f,g,i
2. Perceived HUNSF ego	17
3. HUNSF's attitude to regulations	19
4. HUNSF's perceived utility	24-27

Table 3. List of dependent and independent variables

The last alternative dependent variable is of HUNSF's perceived utility by the subjects. This is thought to cause significant variance on the main dependent variable, and is created by merging the responses of four related opinion questions. Two of these are directed at the subjects' assessments on whether the same investment into some other HDF capacity would result in higher political and military returns on the investment (Questions 24 & 25). The other two queries relate to the subjects' perceptions about how necessary HUNSF is to the functioning of the HDF and whether other capabilities should receive more attention instead of HUNSF (Questions 26 & 27).⁸²

B. ANALYSIS OF THE BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT

In this section, first the independent and dependent variables will be analyzed with the intent to determine their relevance and weight. Then regression testing will be used to explain and analyze the causal mechanisms between the independent and dependent variables. The goal of the evaluation is to find out about the fit and significance of the model and to clarify whether the statistical analysis of the data is congruent with the theoretical expectations.

⁸² DV4 is generated by dividing the sum of the responses to Q26 and Q27 with the sum of Q24 and 25: $DV4 = \frac{(R26+R27)}{(R24+R25)}$.

1. Statistical (Descriptive) Analysis of the Variables

Among the independent variables, organizational exposure has the highest mean with a smaller standard deviation. This suggests that the majority of the subjects, or the group they belong to, were exposed to HUNSF related issues with very alike and high frequency. This result adds considerable weight to this independent variable.

The independent variable with the second highest mean is operational exposure with sizeable standard deviation. The high standard deviation is likely to be rooted in the fact that the relevant question in the survey inquired about both the subjects' experience in operational theaters and their exposure to SOF while they had been deployed. Although 81% of the subjects had operational background, a mere 53% percent of these subjects had first-hand experience of varying degree with SOF.

The mean of the educational exposure variable is low with a very high standard deviation. This is congruent with the sample of the survey, as the overwhelming majority of the subjects were non-SOF personnel with marginal SOF education, whereas some of the SOF subjects had undergone substantial SOF training and/or education.

Variable	Mean (mean/max.)	Standard deviation	Values	
			Pos.	Neg.
<i>Independent</i>				
1. Operational exposure	3.86 (48%)	2.60	8	1
2. Educational exposure	7.43 (26%)	6.22	28	1
3. Organizational exposure	5.95 (85%)	1.44	7	1
4. Military value alignment	3.19 (32%)	1.80	10	0
5. SF's attitude to other forces	4.82 (69%)	1.63	7	1
<i>Dependent</i>				
1. Relative attitude to SF	1.23 (22%)	0.35	5.5	0.19
2. Perceived HUNSF ego	5.50 (78%)	1.63	7	1
3. SF's attitude to regulations	5.55 (79%)	1.48	1*	7*
4. HUNSF's perceived utility	2.18 (31%)	1.67	7	(2/14)

Table 4. Descriptive analysis of the variables

The 3.19 mean of the military value alignment variable is equally low. This means that of the ten general military organizational values the subjects were required to choose out of thirty-nine in Question 12, only an average of 3.19, or 32%, corresponded with those they thought were HUNSF's organizational values. While this is the result of an intentionally subjective assessment, the overarching perception of the subjects is that the organizational values of the conventional military and HUNSF are fundamentally different.

The two strongest proxy dependent variables are HUNSF's perceived attitude toward regulations and HUNSF assumed ego with means of 5.55 and 5.50 respectively. The standard deviation is low in both cases, which signals a strong agreement among the subjects. For the variable depicting HUNSF's perceived attitude toward regulations the scaling of the answers was such that higher values in the responses signaled more favorable answers for HUNSF. The mean of HUNSF's perceived ego indicates that the subjects tended to agree/strongly agree with the statement that HUNSF believes special does translate as better and, hence, HUNSF considers itself better than the rest of the HDF.

Similarly, the variable with regard to HUNSF's attitude to regulations shows an equally strong agreement, as the subjects tended to concur/strongly concur that HUNSF is less "law abiding" than other HDF units.⁸³ This survey result seems to underline the hypothesis that the conventional military considered HUNSF's level of "law abidance" rather low.

The subjects' relative attitude towards HUNSF is captured in the first dependent variable. Here the mean is positioned toward the lower, less favorable end of the scale, indicating the subjects' somewhat negative attitude to HUNSF. Table 5 portrays the relevant sub-questions and their statistical analysis in addition to the data shown in Table 4.

⁸³ Here the scale was labeled as such: 1: HUNSF follows the regulations more than other HDF units, 4: there is no difference between HUNSF and other units, 7: HUNSF is less likely to follow the regulations compared to other HDF units.

To what extent do you think the followings characterize HUNSF?			
Sub-question	Attribute	Mean	Standard deviation
High level of training	positive	5.38	0.97
Superior leadership	positive	4.58	1.12
Hardworking personnel	positive	6.00	0.84
Secrecy	negative	5.24	0.83
Despise of non-SF units/personnel	negative	4.29	1.79
HUNSF bends rules	negative	3.76	2.06

Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the relative attitude to HUNSF

The subjects' attitude is not entirely negative, since they believe HUNSF to be highly trained and hardworking with means in the "agree" and "strongly agree domain," and a low standard deviation in the case of the first two values. At the same time, HUNSF leadership and HUNSF's despise of non-HUNSF personnel is in the "no strong opinion" realm. The high standard deviation of the last statement is also remarkable. This indicates a strong inconsistency among the responses with the mean remaining in the "no strong opinion" and the "somewhat agree" field. This is rather conflicting with the results of Question 19, explained above under HUNSF's perceived utility, which may be the result of the more straightforward wording of the statement in Question 8.

The last dependent variable is generated from four questions that all concern the subjects' perceptions on the military and political utility of HUNSF. The mean of the responses indicates that the subjects are not convinced about HUNSF's utility and necessity as an HDF capacity, since the value of the mean (2.18) is below the middle neutral figure (3.57) with a standard deviation of 1.67.

2. Models⁸⁴

The model concerns the subjects' relative attitude toward HUNSF in terms of the five independent variables. The model is believed to capture the tendencies and the variance that the independent variables cause, through the

⁸⁴ After having run all four possible regressions with the five independent variables and changing the proxy dependent variables, one regression model proved to be of significance.

proxy dependent variables, in the main dependent variable. The model, hence, is to test the hypotheses introduced in the first chapter.⁸⁵

The first hypothesis assumes that the relevant HDF personnel's increased operational, educational and organizational exposure to HUNSF and special operations has a positive effect, through the positive change in the relative attitudes, on the permissiveness of the environment HUNSF operates in. In other words, increased interaction generates a more positive relative attitude in the conventional military towards HUNSF. It is also presupposed that this interaction increases HUNSF's ambiguous perceived utility, and decreases the perception that HUNSF routinely bends rules.

The second hypothesis concerns the military organizational values. The assumption is that the more closely aligned the military organizational values between the HDF and HUNSF are, the more favorable the abovementioned dependent variables are for HUNSF development and upkeep. For this hypothesis, another method besides regression will also be used for testing purposes.

3. Regression Analysis

Table 6 shows the regression's results for the model's dependent variable. The analysis conveys that the model is strong, since the R-squared value, "that is a summary measure that tells how well the sample regression line fits the data,"⁸⁶ is beyond 0.5.⁸⁷ The P-values are, on the other hand, higher than 0.05 in

⁸⁵ Since "the success of regression analysis depends on the availability of the appropriate data," the data set has been tested for collinearity and multicollinearity in order to "measure the *strength or degree of linear association*" between the independent variables. The testing produced very small coefficients and variance inflation factors well below 10 (between 1.03 and 1.48) for the independent variables. This predicts that the IVs are less likely to inflate one another and distort the overall results by producing large standard errors in the models. Other tests included Kernel diagnostics, Kameron and Trivedi's test, Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity and the Ramsey RESET test. For the detailed regression results see Appendix B.

Damodar N. Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*, Third Edition (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 27, 322.

⁸⁶ Damodar N. Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*, Third Edition (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 74.

the case of operational and organizational exposure and the values are very high in the case of educational exposure. Since the respective coefficient seems equally irrelevant, the impact of educational exposure seems substantively and statistically weak. It must also be noted that, due to the relatively small sample size, the size of the coefficients and the P-values should be treated with caution and the model needs to be analyzed with the intent of looking for trends rather than for particular and nuanced observations.

The model itself can be described as Operational Exposure + Organizational Exposure—HUNSF’s Attitude to the HDF + Degree of Military Organizational Value Alignment = HDF’s Relative Attitude toward HUNSF.

Independent variables (1-5)	Coefficient	P-value
Operational exposure	-0.033	0.186
Educational exposure	-0.000	0.937
Organizational exposure	-0.062	0.160
SF’s attitude to other forces	-0.094	0.019
Degree of mil. organizational value alignment	0.074	0.031
R-squared		
0.61		

Table 6. Regression results: relative attitude toward HUNSF

Organizational exposure has a relatively low negative coefficient and, thus, effect on the dependent variable. If we downplay the respective P-value, organizational exposure to HUNSF has a small negative effect on the subjects’ relative attitude toward HUNSF. Operational exposure is stronger in terms of the P-value but has a lower coefficient that negatively affects the dependent variable.

HUNSF’s attitude toward the HDF negatively influences the relative attitudes of the latter toward HUNSF. This is of no particular surprise—unlike the

⁸⁷ “The R-squared is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable [relative attitude toward HUNSF] which can be explained by the independent variables [operational, educational and organizational exposure and the degree of military value alignment].” R-squared is a value between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the higher the “fit” or the accuracy of the regression model.

trends with regard to operational exposure. The degree of military organizational value alignment is of significance. Though its coefficient is small, the “return on investment” into this variable definitely produces consistent “profit” on the relative attitude of the subjects, since the respective P-value is very low, which indicates a high statistical confidence.

a. *Organizational Values: Differences in Preferences*

Since the military organizational values’ alignment proved to be the most significant in the statistical analysis above, this arrangement deserves further analysis. The overarching perception of the subjects was that the organizational values of the conventional military and HUNSF are fundamentally different. In terms of the general military organizational values in Question 12, nine of them were chosen by at least ten subjects, while seven perceived HUNSF values scored at least ten hits by the subjects. The only value that was marked at least by ten subjects (48%) in both Questions 12 and 15 is teamwork.

In Questions 14 and 16, the subjects were asked to single out at most five values they thought HUNSF (in Question 14) and the HDF (in Question 16) should promote more than they did. For HUNSF, the results indicate the subjects’ a strong desire for more interaction with the HDF. Collaboration/cooperation scored seven and teamwork nine hits respectively. These are notably higher than the other values scored in the same question. This result clearly indicates that the subjects would prefer to interact a good deal more with HUNSF than it is currently the case. The indirect inference is that there is receptiveness in the environment for a more open and engaging HUNSF.

Organizational value	Hits	HUNSF should foster more
Discipline/Order	15	4
Teamwork	12	9
Collaboration/Cooperation	12	7
Loyalty	12	1
Responsibility	12	1
Dependability	12	1
Efficiency	11	2
Flexibility	10	3
Accuracy	10	2

Table 7. Most relevant general military organizational values

Apart from the values listed in Table 7, respect and rules/regulations also scored relatively high on the “HUNSF should foster more” question (five and three hits respectively). This, along with the four markings of discipline/order, strengthens the notion indicated by the statistical analysis of the independent and the dependent variables: the subjects were not particularly satisfied with HUNSF’s perceived attitude to regulations and toward the conventional military. By combining these and the observations in the above paragraph, we can conclude that there is a strong desire for more interaction with HUNSF on the condition that HUNSF is seen to be more respectful of the conventional military and the way it works.

Question 16 of the survey captured the subjects’ assumptions about HUNSF’s values. The most often chosen characteristics are listed in Table 7. Dedication, ambition and courage scored amazingly high; they were marked by more than 70% of the subjects. Diversity, dignity, teamwork and challenge were pointed out by almost 50% of the subjects. This is a clear sign that the subjects had tremendous respect for what HUNSF is and what it does. What seems to concern the subjects is how HUNSF goes about business in terms of “law abidance” and respect for the conventional military. This finding, again, is of substance, as it signals the subjects’ general acceptance and receptiveness for HUNSF. The implication can well be a potentially accommodating bureaucratic operating environment for HUNSF.

Organizational value	Hits	HDF should foster more
Ambition	16	5
Dedication	16	2
Courage	15	2
Accomplishment	12	5
Teamwork	11	0
Dignity	10	0
Diversity	10	0
Collectivism	9	7
Challenge	9	6

Table 8. Perceived most relevant HUNSF military organizational values

It must be noted that in Question 14 the subjects were asked to mark the *actual* standards they thought characterized HUNSF most, while in Question 12 they were to choose *general* military values for a military. To explore this latter probe more, Question 13 inquired the extent, on a one to seven scale, to which the subjects thought the general military values they picked in the previous question were valid for the HDF. The mean of the responses (3.61) is between the “not particularly” and the “no strong opinion” field with a high level of agreement among the subjects (the standard deviation is 0.92). This indicates the subjects’ aspiration for a more value-oriented HDF that may also be the reason for the displayed receptiveness for HUNSF, since they perceive HUNSF as a very much value-centric organization.

As for the values the subjects would probably prefer, apart from the ones they singled out as general military standards shown in Table 6, the ones that scored high on the HUNSF value question are telling. *Collectivism, challenge, ambition and accomplishment are the military organizational traits that subjects chose most often as HUNSF attributes that the HDF ought to advance more.*⁸⁸ Flexibility and improvement are not listed in Table 7, though these also scored relatively high with four markings each. On the other hand, diversity and

⁸⁸ Collectivism was translated into the Hungarian questionnaires as *összetartozás*. This, unlike the English word, is neither a negative nor a loaded term, and it is not associated with communism or socialism. Instead, the translation emphasizes a sense of “we belong together” and an orientation that favors group/organizational interests instead of individual ones.

dignity, although they scored high among the perceived HUNSF values, were not chosen by any of the subjects as the ones that should be promoted in the HDF.

These findings indicate a desire for a clearly articulated mission for the HDF that can be easily translated into everyday life and what the personnel can identify themselves with and pursue. The high scores of *challenge and ambition* appear to be signs of the HDF personnel's aspiration for more demanding and higher-aiming tasks and objectives, whereas those of *accomplishment, collectivism* and *improvement* are indicators of strong wishes for shared and significant organizational successes. *Flexibility* can be interpreted as the appreciation of and longing for an increased organizational responsiveness and ability to adapt to the challenges of the complex and dynamic environment.

In summation, the organizational values of the (conventional) military and HUNSF were found fundamentally different with hardly any overlap. The traditional military values are more performance and process oriented, while the HUNSF values seem to be more dynamic and effects focused. These findings are well aligned with the organizational design theory explored in Chapter III. This evaluation is by no means a rank-ordering type estimate but a justifiable observation based on the survey data.

The difference in preferred organizational values is obvious; however, this difference is only a source of conflict between the parties concerned if these diverse traits are not mutually appreciated. The data analysis shows that HDF's bureaucratic environment is generally receptive toward HUNSF and would prefer more interaction with HUNSF. The HDF only demands more responsibility and respect from HUNSF in return. This finding is not even particularly counterintuitive and does not appear to require HUNSF to give up any of its truly precious values but to add humbleness to the list. Interestingly enough, the analysis of the answers also signals the responders' strong desire for some changes to the bureaucratic environment to encompass some of the perceived, and preferred, HUNSF attributes.

C. OVERALL RESEARCH RESULTS VS. EXPECTATIONS

In general terms, the expectation of the research was that the identified independent variables would cause variance on the dependent variable. Both the descriptive and the regression analysis results proved to be only partially aligned with the particular expectations, although the overall survey result analysis still significantly reinforces the hypotheses and validates the expectations.

Operational exposure has a small negative effect on the bureaucratic environment's tolerance for HUNSF. This is most likely the result of the subjects' unfavorable experiences with special operations forces. Less than 30% of the subjects had operational experience with SOF, as HUNSF has mostly been deployed with allied forces for special operations purposes.⁸⁹ Thus, the variable's adverse effect on the dependent variable is most likely the net result of HUNSF personnel's deployment to non-SOF operations with other HDF personnel and the subjects' experience with SOF other than HUNSF.

Similarly, organizational exposure is of adverse effect to a certain extent. It signals that the subjects' engagement with HUNSF in a bureaucratic setting has created a non-permissive atmosphere for HUNSF. A probable explanation might be that the dynamic nature of HUNSF's early development and its struggle for survival placed undue demands on the bureaucracy that was unsuited and

⁸⁹ The empirical research, since it was specifically directed at the bureaucratic environment, did not address the specific group of HDF members who have served jointly with HUNSF in NATO ISAF missions such as the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and the Kabul International Airport. In the case of the OMLT, conventional and SF forces, along with elements of the U.S. Ohio National Guard, serve together and provide training and advising for a particular Kandak of the Afghan National Army. As for the KAIA mission, the HDF provided the commander and the bulk of the personnel for the operation of the airport. The HDF element included a Special Operations Task Unit for close protection purposes. These joint experiences' effects that are relevant to the present research offer a field for further research. Since the success of these operations required regular and institutionalized cooperation from both the conventional and the SOF elements, greater liking and mutual respect were the likely outcomes in accordance with Cialdini who found that "cooperation is a powerful cause of liking."

Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence—The Psychology of Persuasion*, Revised edition (New York: Collins Business, 2007), 185.

unprepared for both the urgency and the nature of such requests. The more often the subjects were exposed to such situations in the organization, the more frustration they had to cope with.⁹⁰

HUNSF's attitude toward the subjects/conventional military proved to be a strong variable with a relatively high negative effect on the dependent variable. This is not counterintuitive, as no one likes to be disrespected and if someone is, then they are less likely to be tolerant with their counterpart.

The similarity of military values caused the second most significant variance on the dependent variable, only the variance was positive this time. More closely aligned military values between the conventional and special forces increase the permissiveness of the bureaucratic environment. The analysis also revealed that the overlap between the two value sets in the sample was very thin. The general military values and the ones the subjects thought were of HUNSF's seemed to point toward two entirely different organizations and preferences. This finding reinforces the explanations provided by the study of organizational design theory.

The statistical analysis of the responses to the survey questions also disclosed that the majority of the responders agreed/strongly agreed that HUNSF thought it was better than the conventional military and tended to disregard the regulations more than other HDF units. While there was no particular expectation attached to these observations, these results correspond with Cohen's findings on "elite units." On the other hand, the responders appear to somewhat accept

⁹⁰ This explanation with regard to the absence of the desired positive effect of the operational and organizational exposure variables on the dependent variable is reinforced by the results of three independent empirical psychological researches that are quoted by Cialdini in his book on influence: "[R]esearch shows that becoming familiar with something through repeated contact doesn't necessarily cause greater liking. In fact, continued exposure to a person or object under unpleasant conditions such as frustration, conflict, or competition leads to less liking."

Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence—The Psychology of Persuasion*, Revised edition (New York: Collins Business, 2007), 178.

HUNSF's elite status in terms of its personnel, as they rather agreed (standard deviation: 1.6) that HUNSF tried to recruit valuable human resources for itself (mean: 5.2 on a 1 through 7 scale).




Table 9. Subjects' perceptions of HUNSF tasks

The research reinforces the hypothesis that the general understanding of special forces and special operations is very superficial. Table 8 illustrates the subjects' responses (in percentage) to Question 11. The number of choices was unlimited and the options purposefully included some ambiguity. Although only three answers were perfectly correct, none of them was false, as they were subsets of the main tasks or were additional ones. Special reconnaissance, direct actions and the ill-defined counterterrorism were the ones chosen by more than 70% of the subjects. Whereas the first two are, indeed, core tasks of HUNSF, they are also the most conventional ones. Operations with strategic military/political impact and training and advising of allied forces, that capture the essence of SF, scored 48 and 52% respectively.

The inadequate and insufficient understanding of special forces and their operations was reinforced by Question 9 where there were no choices offered and the results were generated entirely from the subjects' replies (Table 9). Here "different tasks" as a distinction was mentioned in more than 40% of the responses, which fact is somewhat contradictory to the relevant findings of the

previously discussed question. This response indicates that the subjects tend to see the differences more in terms of tasks than anything else, but still consider those tasks to be largely conventional (direct actions, special reconnaissance). This assumption is reinforced by another set of answers where 73% stated that some special operations can be conducted by conventional forces and others cannot. While this is certainly true, the overarching assumption appears to be that SF is better and even specially trained and better equipped, but still not “special.” These responses are of no surprise given that the majority of the subjects, just like the HDF, never had a chance to study special operations (less than one fourth of the responders considered their SOF education and training level significant). More familiarity with the HUNSF tasks and the nature of special operations would probably positively influence the relevant audience’s perception with regard to HUNSF’s role in the HDF’s task set.




Table 10. Alleged differences between special and conventional forces

HUNSF’s perceived military and political utility was found low (Questions 24-27). This is in line with the expectations, though the results are worse than expected. Interestingly enough, the responses to the last survey question are somewhat contradictory to the above outcome. To the question of what HDF capabilities should be preferred in the place of the HDF’s special forces capacity,

71% chose to answer that none of the offered ought to be preferred in the place of HUNSF, as HUNSF is an important capability of the military. While the variable that captures HUNSF's utility has probably more latitude, since the questions that were combined into this variable were less direct, in the course of a prospect education and information "campaign" not only the issue of *what is HUNSF's utility* needs to be addressed, but also the *why and just how exactly is HUNSF a useful capability of the HDF*.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The empirical research and the statistical analysis of the gathered data were used to test the hypotheses and the findings generally correlate with the expectations. In cases where this correlation is weak or contrary to what was anticipated, sound explanations could be found.

Increasingly corresponding military values of the conventional military's bureaucratic environment and that of associated with HUNSF by the subjects have been found the most relevant independent variable that produces the desirable variance on the dependent variable, the permissiveness of HUNSF's immediate operating environment. On the other hand, a decrease in HUNSF's apparently disrespectful attitude toward the conventional military also inducts positive variance in the dependent variable.

The analysis also found that the bureaucratic environment appears to be generally receptive to an increased interaction with HUNSF and is essentially approving of HUNSF. This is regardless of the proven fact that the subjects in the representative sample displayed very limited understanding of special forces and special operations and the potentials thereof. The research also ascertained that the discrimination between special forces/operations and conventional forces/operations is based on speculative rather than informational and educational grounds. The rationale for this is that the special operations capacity is a recent virtue of the HDF that has not been fully incorporated into the standard military education and training system. Moreover, the secretiveness

that has characterized HUNSF since its formation, as this was affirmed by the research, has also disabled the flow of information on HUNSF.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUNSF AND THE HDF

The analysis of the empirical research, and HUNSF's domestic operating environment, highlights challenges in HUNSF's development and upkeep that are, for the most part, non-material in nature. Notwithstanding the effects of the current unfavorable financial-economic circumstances, the time period characterized by these adverse conditions may be utilized for non-materiel investments into, and adjustments to, HUNSF and its bureaucratic environment. The transition from the current focus on SF to a more meaningful SOF capacity requires a less disrespectful and isolated HUNSF, enhanced and targeted communication, investment into SOF human capital on levels other than the tactical, fine-tuning the organizational command and control relationships and the unification of SOF elements.

A. THE END OF ISOLATION

Regardless of whether the first stage of HUNSF development was rightfully surrounded with secrecy, this research suggests that the consolidation of HUNSF needs much less of such protective concealment. The preservation and proper employment of the SF capacity, as the historical examples discussed in Chapter III indicate, require the stakeholders and the bureaucracy to know and understand the capabilities and limitations of HUNSF, SOF and special operations.⁹¹ This requires more substantial communication, although "going public" also has restrictions. Differentiation must be made between information that has been simply inaccessible and that which is actively kept secret or confidential.⁹²

⁹¹ The relevant results of the empirical research discussed in the previous chapter justified the assumption with regard to the lack of appropriate understanding of SOF and special operations by the HDF as well as the unduly high level of secrecy that surrounds HUNSF.

⁹² Sissela Bok, *Secrets—On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 217.

1. The Balance Between Confidentiality and Openness

Understandably, thinning the secrecy screen may be seen as a threat to HUNSF's status quo, power and authority. Operations and information security (OPSEC & INFOSEC) concerns may be (mis)used to hinder the more generous flow of information with regard to HUNSF and also for shutting down debate. Operations and information security are definitely legitimate concerns if they are used for what they are intended: the concealment of information that, when exploited, can have an adverse effects on own actions and/or the capacity to conduct them.

Based on Bok's observations, the potential risks of the excessive collective and individual secrecy that were highlighted by the research⁹³ include but are not limited to: increased chance for exercising power without accountability; decreased willingness to cooperate with others; limited chances of disapproval or sanctions of one's actions.⁹⁴ Moreover, undue secrecy enables "discrimination ... between insider and outsider, between those apart and all others."⁹⁵ The least desirable effect of unwarranted secrecy is almost certainly that it can reduce the sense of

[...] responsibility for joint decisions and facilitate all forms of skewed or careless judgment, including that exhibited in taking needless risks. It offers participants a shield against outside criticism, and can obscure the possibilities of failure.⁹⁶

⁹³ As discussed in the previous chapter, the subjects in the survey found secrecy a trait that characterizes HUNSF (on the 1 through 7 scale, the mean of the answers is 5.24 with a relatively low level of standard deviation).

⁹⁴ Sissela Bok, *Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 106–111.

⁹⁵ Sissela Bok, *Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 110.

⁹⁶ Sissela Bok, *Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 109.

The survey results are consistent with this observation.⁹⁷ A widely known U.S. example of what disproportionate secrecy can lead to is the case of the badly failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, known as Operation Eagle Claw, where obsession with security made coordination between forces involved next to impossible and also severely limited the sound judgment of key political and military decision makers.⁹⁸

As for other possible concerns against a more open HUNSF, the preservation of the perceived status quo, power and authority are mostly meaningful from an individualistic perspective. Given that HUNSF is a “public venture” as an element of the HDF that is one of the pillars of state power, alleged or actual individual (e.g., career) interests need to be aligned with those of the organization. This argument is unlikely to have much persuasive power in a highly individualist society and in a rightfully competitive military. Henceforth, organizational incentives need to be provided that can effectively promote both organizational and individual interest. The issue of incentives and commitment will, henceforth, be revisited in a subsequent section.

2. Going Public on Multiple Fronts

Disproportionate openness can equally be counterproductive or irrelevant. The latter is the case when the disclosed information is limited to “public relations,” that only conveys rosy images and success stories, or to public affairs with largely neutral messages. In support of finding the right balance between what can be revealed and what ought to be preserved, Bok suggests the “test of *actual* publicity” and argues for the

⁹⁷ The subjects’ observations on secrecy seem to be independent from their attitude to HUNSF, since there cannot be found any strong correlation between any given subject’s perception of HUNSF secrecy and his level of value alignment with HUNSF values or his perceptions about HUNSF disrespect toward the HDF. Subjects who gave high points for HUNSF’s secrecy were found to have both low and higher military organizational value alignment. Their answers’ variance to the question of whether HUNSF disregards the conventional military was also considerable.

⁹⁸ Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, *Perilous Options-Special Operations as an Instrument of the U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 114-151.

[...] necessity to articulate one's own position carefully, to defend it against unexpected counterarguments, to take opposing views into consideration, to reveal the steps of reasoning one has used, and to state openly the principles to which one appeals.⁹⁹

Actual publicity should be at least twofold for HUNSF: first, it needs to be manifested in an education and training portfolio for select non-SF JFC (and MoD) personnel that can and will form the supportive environmental segment for future HUNSOF.¹⁰⁰ On the tactical level, the recently introduced enhanced joint training with other, mainly SOF or SOF capable, HDF units will be amended by providing extensive and unique training opportunities for HDF units.¹⁰¹

The second portfolio concerns the management of HUNSF-related information that is released to the public in general and to the military in particular.¹⁰² HUNSOF's role in a more open communication can be that of a trailblazer that also draws the attention of the targeted audiences to the messages. On the Web sites intended for public access and for internal military communication respectively, provided that the majority of the changes suggested in Appendix C are realized in accordance with the JFC Commander's intent,

⁹⁹ Sissela Bok, *Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 114.

¹⁰⁰ Even though the educational exposure did not prove to be a strong predictor during the statistical analysis, SOF education is still considered a key element of the broader effort to shape the environment. This is discussed in a subsequent section in detail.

¹⁰¹ The 34th SF Battalion has had, since its establishment, joint exchange training events with non-military anti-terrorist forces. Cooperation with other HDF units has been rather limited so far. Nonetheless, some of the Military Occupational Specialty trainings during the 2008 national Special Forces Qualification Course were open to applicants from units other than the 34th SF Battalion.

¹⁰² The MoD has been traditionally one of the most pragmatic among government agencies in the utilization of modern media. A clear sign of this modernity is that some of the social networking Web 2.0 applications are now embedded into the HDF's official Web site and the fact that there are several MoD-run Web sites. The vehicles of modern Web-based communication and the capacity to maintain and manage them are, therefore, in existence; it is only necessary to structure them along the lines of target audience, or stakeholders, and expected benefits. Divided across the lines of stakeholders, the MoD and the HDF should probably consider domestic public, internal and international target audiences. This division more or less determines the functions, the content and the accessibility of the respective Web sites. The idea behind this information campaign is that the relevant result of the empirical research (answers to Question 4) shows that the subjects' second most significant source of information on SOF and special operations was books and documentaries (33%). This indicates a certain level of interest in the subject that could be elaborated by more readily available, select and channeled non-fictional content.

HUNSF needs to be first of the among the HDF and MoD elements that achieves actual publicity. This must be paralleled with user-created and official accounts of deployed units' experiences and activity, as those are also "attention catchers" by virtue of human nature: we want to have our say and uncover mysteries (of combat).

This proposal is undoubtedly a considerable departure from today's policy of "public relations." The potential benefits, however, seem to outweigh the likely risks. Releasing SOF tasks, organization, SF acceptance criteria, general information on and accounts of weaponry and training should attract visitors by the virtue of fact that these are "special."¹⁰³ Non-sensitive reports and diaries of past combat operations that have no adverse impact on current and future ones but can contribute to enhanced training and doctrine, increased public attention and appreciation involve no political or military risk whatsoever, on the condition that information security is abided. The major stumbling block here is that information security, as noted in the first section of this chapter, may be purposefully or unintentionally ill-defined and hinder the implementation of a more open and modern communications strategy.

B. HUMANS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN HARDWARE¹⁰⁴

The second element of the "actual publicity" is an education and training portfolio for select non-SF personnel. The past five years of HUNSF development has constructed a deployable tactical Special Forces capability for the HDF. Also,

¹⁰³ To be successful, such campaign obviously requires more than mere publicity. The contents released must target specific audiences with specific messages on adequate channels of communication in order to gain attention and result in the desired attitudes and behavior of the recipients.

¹⁰⁴ The title of this section refers to one of the five so-called SOF Truths. The often-quoted SOF Truths originate from the former U.S. Army Colonel, John M. Collins, although the fifth Truth is less well known than the first four. The full set of SOF Truths: 1) Humans are more important than hardware; 2) Their quality is more important than quantities; 3) Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced; 4) Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur; 5) Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

John M. Collins, *United States and Soviet Special Operations: A Study* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1987), xiii.

as discussed in Chapter III, the second phase of SF evolution requires legislative action and experienced and incentivized facilitators within and outside the military. Recognizing that the current tactical capability and capacity still need to be improved, the second stage of HUNSF evolution desperately needs facilitators at the operational and strategic level. This poses a huge but resolvable challenge for HUNSF. Since organizations are often poorly equipped to perform diverse tasks well, the resolution comes through compromises.

The first SOF truth, humans are more important than hardware, is not limited to SOF operators.¹⁰⁵ This is especially true in the present case of HUNSF with its very limited representation and, hence, leverage, or the lack thereof, at the operational and strategic level. Officers and non-commissioned officers with tactical level training and experience are much needed in the 34th SF Battalion and, due to the small size of the unit, it is very unlikely that in the near future such expertise will be available in sufficient quality and quantity for the staffing of operational and strategic level headquarters and command elements such as the JFC and the MoD. One of the two elements of the proposed solution to this issue is presented here, while the other component, that concerns organizational changes, is discussed in the subsequent section of the current chapter.

1. Bureaucratic Guerrillas

HUNSF's representation within the JFC is limited to a Special Operations Section with a handful of positions within the J37 Operations and Training Branch. At the strategic level, in the MoD, there is virtually no dedicated representation whatsoever; HUNSF-related issues are primarily dealt with by personnel for whom these are additional tasks.¹⁰⁶ As noted in the Introduction,

¹⁰⁵ The respective empiric research results (in Question 8) found that tactical SOF operators are considered well trained and hardworking by the subjects. The survey produced less clear results with regard to whether HUNSF possessed high-tech hardware (mean around the median: 4.28).

¹⁰⁶ The subjects in the survey seemed to be aware of this notion, as they only "somewhat agreed" (mean 4.71) to the statement that HUNSF had dedicated advocates within the JFC and the MoD (Question 8).

HUNSF needs to develop an unconventional approach that is capable of, among other things, shaping the environment in which it operates without turning it against itself. This shaping includes defining allies as broadly as possible and “adversaries” as narrowly as possible. Apart from invaluable passive allies, who are not antagonistic towards HUNSF, HUNSF needs active supporters in the bureaucratic environment, who actually “get things done.” The group of such allies can be considered as bureaucratic guerrillas who are selected, trained, equipped, organized and inspired by SOF operators and “fight” for the benefit of both their own individual interests and those of the organization.¹⁰⁷

In the JFC there is a Special Operations Working Group (SOWG) that draws members from the key branches and departments of the organization and which convenes regularly. The members, however, are delegated by their branches or departments and not selected for the SOWG based on their SOF backgrounds or dedication to the cause. The SOF-related tasks are in addition to the members’ workload and result in no particular benefits for those who perform them. In practice, compliance and willingness to substantially contribute is contingent upon the individual’s main workload and his or her personal affections towards the case at hand and not by the individual’s commitment to HUNSF. This is not to say that the SOWG has been entirely ineffective or unsuccessful; very much the contrary. Yet, a more permanent and SOF-educated, devoted core of non-SOF staff personnel could have achieved even more.

The creation of dedicated non-SOF personnel for the support of the broader SOF development has to overcome at least two major burdens—assuming that such education and training program receive a green light. Incentives must be offered for the department and branch chiefs, so that they consent for their subordinates’ participation in the SOF education and training

¹⁰⁷ It may seem odd to emphasize the significance of organizational exposure of non-SOF personnel to SOF, since the regression analysis in the previous chapter indicated a negative correlation between such exposure and the relative attitude toward HUNSF. The objective here is to reverse-engineer the process, as limiting the organizational exposure is not a viable option for HUNSF, because that would only increase its isolation.

program. Second, incentives need to be offered for the personnel, so they would want to undergo selection and the subsequent SOF program and then would be duty-bound for active HUNSOF support as an additional task to their workload.¹⁰⁸

The respective branch chiefs must be engaged by SOF personnel whom the given branch chief would consider a credible partner. The one-on-one type discussions must address both the concerns the engaged senior officer is likely to raise in opposition and also the potential benefits in terms of the increased authority the department or the branch can gain by delegating one or two staff officers to HUNSOF related tasks. The delegation of staff members can provide the branch chiefs with both timely information on and a sense of control over ever-occurring HUNSOF-related matters.

The prospective guerrillas' incentives include the participation in the education and training program (discussed later in detail) can offer. Also, the positive examples of HDF and MoD HUNSOF staff personnel's achievement can be inspiring. Most of them, just like the future guerrillas, had no substantive tactical level SOF background prior to their enrollment into or affiliation with HUNSOF. Moreover, the individual incentives would include "tabbing" the "guerrillas." Upon the completion of the selection and the first segment of the education and training program, the non-organizational SOF staff personnel would be awarded with the distinctive "Special Operations Forces—Staff" tab in recognition of their achievement and effort.¹⁰⁹ The "tabbing" may seem awfully

¹⁰⁸ Incentives or rewards are especially difficult to create in government bureaucracies such as the military. Wilson makes note of "nonmaterial awards" and list them as "a sense of duty and purpose, the status that derives from individual recognition and personal power, and the associational benefits that come from being part of an organization (or a small group within that organization) that is highly regarded by its members or by society at large." Since the organizational values of HUNSF were generally "highly regarded" by the subjects and it is also a "small group" within the larger organization of the JFC and the HDF, it is reasonable to assume that Wilson's nonmaterial rewards could, indeed, be function as incentives for prospect "guerrillas."

James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 157–158.

¹⁰⁹ The broad idea of "tabbing" originates from one of the numerous discussions between the author and Lieutenant Colonel Porkoláb.

trivial, though it is believed to have considerable motivational power, as it signals an accomplishment for others and offers a sense of belonging to a distinct group for the bearer.¹¹⁰

2. Selection, Assessment, Education, and Training

The screening process for the selection and assessment must target individuals who, if enrolled, are likely to be successful. Hence, screening need to include past performance with regard to HUNSF support and peer review, or referencing, based on reasonably objective observations and judgment. The selection and assessment process must be swift and simple and focus on mainly personal traits rather than physical ones, although physical fitness will be examined. The goal is not to put undue emphasis on the physical attributes, as this may well discourage candidates. Moreover, the program is not intended to find tactical operators but to create a commitment to SOF and a sense of mission among the candidates by providing them with SOF education and an alternative type of organizational exposure to SOF.¹¹¹ The ultimate objective is to turn over the negative trend found in the model's regression analysis with regard to the organizational exposure variable and to make educational exposure a significant element of the equation. In this regard, education and organizational exposure

¹¹⁰ The secondary and equally desired effect of "tabbing," besides as a sign of genuine appreciation of accomplishment, is that it visibly associates the bearer with SOF and creates both a sign and a sense of commitment. To increase this desirable effect, the "tabbing ceremony" needs covered by military media where the names of the "guerillas," with their consent, are also published. The tabbing must be preceded by another campaign among the "proper" SOF elements, as their acceptance of the tabbed personnel as credible future partners is of vital importance for the program.

Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence-The Psychology of Persuasion*, Revised edition (New York: Collins Business, 2007), 101.

¹¹¹ This can also be understood as extending the sense of "specialness" of SOF to the candidates. While this may appear a manipulative attempt, it must be understood that such move will only result in the desired effect on the long run, if the motives behind extending "specialness" are genuine as opposed to manipulative. On the issue of specialness and elites see: Bernd Horn, "Military Ethos," *National Defence and the Canadian Forces*, July 17, 2008, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no4/horn-eng.asp> (accessed March 12, 2010).

are vehicles for cooperation. Henceforth, the program combines intense and broadened organizational and operational/strategic level educational exposure to both SOF theory and practice.

The selection criteria will be limited to the successful completion of the physical fitness standards of the level directly above the one the individual is required to meet in his position. The criteria for the assessment need to be equally clear-cut and should include the possession of at least a national and NATO secret type security clearance and NATO STANAG 6001 2.2.2.2 (or equivalent) English proficiency. What is even more important, an assessment criteria needs to be developed that evaluates the level of the candidate's organizational military value alignment in terms of his preferences for general and SOF values—as discussed in the analytic chapter. Hence, since the intent is to create a group of facilitators for HUNSF development at the operational and strategic level, the degree of value alignment is of major concern in the assessment process.

The selection and assessment is to be conducted as the “0” phase (Day 1) of the two-week initial program in an environment that is physically separated from both the MoD and the JFC and by SOF cadre from the MoD and the JFC to mitigate rank and status concerns. Following the (physical) selection, which is conducted by age groups with the criteria that the group as a whole needs to meet the standards in order to pass, the English proficiency assessment is conducted in the form of ten to fifteen-minute individual presentations on subjects selected by the candidates from a list some days prior to the beginning of the program. The list would contain topics with their relevant background materiel on historical SOF actions, excerpts from the AJP 3.5 Special Operations Policy and HDF SOF contents (doctrine, principles of HUNSOF employment, et cetera). The presentations are evaluated by both the cadre and the peers based on pre-prepared criteria that address the comprehensiveness and style of the brief as well as the self-confidence of the briefer. The assessment with regard to the

organizational values is conducted by the means of standardized sheets. The comprehensive evaluation of the candidates is conducted individually.

The following four days of the program are focused around team-building type activities to advance a sense of camaraderie; historic SOF missions (in English); the organization and tasks of national and allied SOF; SOF command, control and coordination elements (in English); SOF operations planning principles; and the assessment of recent HUNSOF missions. The remaining days of the initial program will be incorporated into the HDF 34th SF Battalion's annual major field exercise and the on-going NATO Special Forces Qualification Course (NSFQC). Apart from participating in the exercise as staff augmentation in dedicated positions, the trainees will familiarize themselves with the Battalion's personnel, conduct basic weapons and equipment training on SOF-specific equipment with subsequent day and night live-fire exercises alongside with the trainees of the NSFQC. Upon the completion of the program, the candidates are awarded the SOF-Staff tab. The program's last day is dedicated for wrap-ups, backbriefs, course evaluation, administration, and redeployment.

This first phase is deliberately short in duration so that the branch chiefs and department heads are more likely to allow for their subordinates' participation. Moreover, this fourteen-day period is planned to be compact, interactive and informative. This phase is not intended to train fully functional SOF staff officers, but to build personal relationships between them and HUNSOF personnel and also generate affection for SOF and elaborate on already existing ties to SOF personnel that are likely to survive the test of future demanding tasks.

The objective is also to screen the personnel for future SOF missions' staff. Since HUNSOF is unlikely to have the capacity to fully staff higher headquarter positions required of a deployed Special Operations Task Group. For this reason, the second segment of the program is meant for those who performed best in the initial program and are willing and have the potential for serving in SOF staff jobs either at deployed special operations headquarters or in

the national command and control elements. They will be enrolled in the relevant orientation and staff officer courses that NATO SOF HQ (NSHQ) offers and which are prerequisites for deploying with NATO SOF.

The third element of the program is a three to five-day annual refresher for the personnel that have gone through at least the initial phase. In this segment, some of the cadre will come from among the SOF staff personnel that, by then, will have had either operational SOF experience or have been enrolled in one or more NSHQ courses. This segment also contains at least a full day spent with the HDF 34th SF Battalion and/or another HUNSOF unit.

3. Investment Into the Future SOF

The survey results show that the vast majority of personnel that participated have not been educated on SOF other than occasional, and very recent, seminars and courses. This is not surprising, since special operations are not included in the standard non-commissioned officer or officer training, even though the HDF has always had light infantry or ranger-type units with the capability to conduct such operations.

Offering a complete set of course proposals for NCO training or officer education is far beyond the author's expertise. Nonetheless, the National Defense University (NDU), where future and current military officers are educated, and the HDF Central Training Base, where the NCO training takes place, need to incorporate special operations into their academic curricula and training programs. The NDU has already made the first steps toward this direction; the design of the special operations curriculum requires the active participation of HUNSOF personnel with the appropriate level of relevant expertise. This is necessary, as the curriculum must be both recent and aligned with the operational needs in order for future officers and NCOs to have an appropriate and accurate awareness of national and NATO SOF.

In 2007, the NDU's Kossuth Lajos Military Science Faculty initiated an education program for students at non-military universities and colleges.¹¹² The program is built around the subject of basic national defense, and 3,238 students in higher education have been enrolled into the program to date. This student number is seemingly insignificant;¹¹³ however, the program is relatively fresh and such programs have no recent history in Hungary. Therefore, the program probably has some potential for increased enrollment. The inclusion of special operations into the program, if properly communicated, may attract more students to the program and can result in an increased public awareness in terms of the HDF's capacities, and, thereby, improve the HDF's status and already considerable public recognition.

C. INTEGRATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION

This section is likely to create controversy, since the distinction between integration and assimilation in terms of SOF and the conventional military is not particularly clear-cut. Also, the preservation of SOF's uniqueness (its organizational culture) is of legitimate concern. Any attempt to move closer to the conventional forces may raise the alarm and result in intense warnings against assimilation. On the other hand, the recent suggestion of the establishment of an IW Command or Adam's idea of an Unconventional Operations Force, explained in Chapter III, are clearly proposals with the purpose of more distinction, though these are not necessarily met with wide and undivided enthusiasm. Additionally, Marquis cautions against casting different SOF units, such as SEALs, Special

¹¹² János Czank, *Honvédelmi alapismeretek már négy felsőoktatási intézményben (Basic military education in four institutes for higher education)*, February 20, 2010, http://portal.zmne.hu/portal/page?_pageid=34,129339&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (accessed March 12, 2010).

¹¹³ This accumulated number is just above 1% of the total student number (381,000) in higher education in academic year 2008/2009.

Ministry of Education and Culture, *Statistical Yearbook of Education 2008/2009*, Department of Administrative Coordination (Budapest: Ministry of Education and Culture, 2009), 10.

Forces and Rangers, “into a traditional unit organization for the ease of management,” as this would most likely result in the loss of distinctive organizational attributes.¹¹⁴

All these are reasonable concerns with their core intents being applicable for HUNSF and the HDF. The notion of an IW Command would most likely be met with justifiable resistance in the HDF, since—due to HDF’s size, principal tasks and its joint force command structure—such command would be a massive overkill. The assemblage of the HDF’s core SOF units under conventional JFC command would be equally counterproductive and exactly the move Marquis cautions against. Nonetheless, some changes to the command and control structure as well as to the force structure are necessary for at least two reasons. First, the HDF, because of its size and limited capacity to project combat support and combat service support, must, and does, think in force capability packages rather than in mere units. Second, for HUNSF values and capacities to be preserved, the SOFization of the current SF capacity is the way forward. The former statement should not require further explanation, since force capability packages have been the policy, but not necessarily the overarching practice, of HDF for some time. SOFization, on the other hand, may sound counterintuitive.

1. Organizational Adjustments: Mutatis Mutandis

This section proposes a SOF command and control relationship that does not require fundamental organizational changes to existing structures and appreciates the joint nature of the military’s present command and control arrangements, but still provides the HDF with the *most basic* command and control elements for the desired SOF capability.

In their thesis, Porkoláb and Bári propose a command and control relationship for HUNSF that places the HDF 34th SF Battalion under the direct command of the Defense Staff and suggest a Special Forces Coordination Office

¹¹⁴ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 262.

(SFCO) within the Defense Staff's Operations and Training Department. The SFCO was envisioned to function as a "horizontal integration team" that stretches over "functional areas to produce sound, integrated, and adaptive solutions" with the section chief reporting directly to the ChoD.¹¹⁵ The SFCO was also to "develop strategies and plans for specific problems" and "direct the HUNSF capability development process at the manager level and interact with all managerial level agencies related to the development process."¹¹⁶ The authors provide an equally detailed description of the SFCO's role for the cases when HUNSF is deployed as part of a larger NATO or EU SOF component.¹¹⁷

The SOF command structure as envisioned by Porkoláb and Bári is sound and the principles described there in terms of national, NATO and EU command relationships are still applicable. The limitation, that only the principles are applicable, comes from the fact that when their thesis was written in 2006, the HDF's command and control structure was different from what it looks like today. In 2007, the Joint Force Command was established in the place of the service commands. The Defense Staff was integrated with the MoD and delegated much of its previous functions to the JFC that now commands and controls the vast majority of the HDF units with the ChoD retaining the direct command of mainly support and administrative units.

The envisioned Special Forces Coordination Office has not been set up in the Defense Staff, but a small Special Operations Section was added to the JFC's J3 Operations instead in 2007 as the first step of HUNSF moving toward institutionalization. Efforts to establish a permanent SOF representation in the MoD Defense Staff have been unsuccessful and the JFC Spec Ops Section was

¹¹⁵ Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, *Enhancing national security in Hungary through the development and employment of Special Forces*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 88.

¹¹⁶ Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, *Enhancing national security in Hungary through the development and employment of Special Forces*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 89.

¹¹⁷ Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, *Enhancing national security in Hungary through the development and employment of Special Forces*, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 92–96.

recently downsized. What seems to follow is that the ideal SOF command structure is unlikely to be implemented without broadening our focus of attention from the special forces capacity to special operations capacity and the latter obtains substantial military leverage.

For the ChoD to retain the capacity and expertise to directly command and control deployed SOF elements and to coordinate the development and support of HUNSOF among the agencies of the MoD and beyond, a coordinating and advisory body is necessary under the direct supervision of the ChoD. Such a section should be able to fulfill the functions of SOF policy making and advising the ChoD on SOF issues, and coordinating among the departments and agencies of the MoD that are beyond the reach of the JFC commander but still are stakeholders in SOF development and employment. The coordinating and advisory body would also oversee the public, internal, and international communication issues explained in *The End of Isolation* section of this current chapter and manage the strategic level communication and coordination within the government and with NATO allies and the EU as applicable.

The establishment of a capable command control and coordination element at the operational level must precede the tactical level unification of HUNSOF. This must occur without expanding the organizational structure or personnel of the JFC, since that structure is not only the result of military and organizational necessities but also of political concerns. The proposed command, control and coordination element could be based on the existing structure of JFC's J9 CIMIC branch with the addition of the functions and personnel of the current J37 Spec Ops Section.¹¹⁸ This way the HUNSOF capacity could have more substantial representation on the strategic and operational level without adding another division to the JFC structure and forcing the SOF adhococracy to establish its own machine-like branch. A unique command arrangement, that retains the ChoD's direct command authority for HUNSOF missions on national

¹¹⁸ This means that the new JFC J9 SOF would have a CIMIC, a PSYOP, and a SOF section.

soil, but delegates command to the JFC for peacetime and over deployed units, would not distort the joint nature of HDF's command and control arrangements. Moreover, without engaging in details regarding the HDF's crisis command and control structure, the JFC would retain HUNSOFC control and coordination for possible HDF (non-allied) operations.

The JFC J9 SOF is not suggested to entirely replace the horizontal functional integrating role of JFC's present Special Operations Working Group nor serve as a quasi Special Operations Command (SOCOM), but rather as a control and coordination element. The J9 SOF's first major mission will be the preparation of the tactical level SOF unification within the military bureaucracy, advancing the capacities of the potential SOF and SOF capable HDF units and enhancing the cooperation between those and HUNSF.

The proposed educational and training program for non-SOF JFC staff personnel will aid the prospective JFC J9 SOF by enhancing it with expertise not present in its structure. Also, the J9 SOF will not eliminate the need for extensive inter-branch coordination and cooperation; neither is the projected education and training program a substitute for the suggested J9 SOF. In fact, the execution of the program, with its obvious effect in terms of shaping perceptions about HUNSOFC, is a prerequisite for the creation of J9 SOF.

There is, however, one element in the J9 SOF's relationship to the command structure of the JFC that is slightly different when compared to the other branches. The JFC commander's already existing advisory staff needs to be amended with a SOF advisory body. This element must enjoy the full consent of the JFC commander and must be legally empowered to make decisions for the JFC commander in order to flatten the SOF chain of command and enable timely and lawful decisions in terms of SOF issues. This would somewhat institutionalize the present practice of SOF, that was also indicated in the empirical research, that seeks out "alternative ways" to engage decision makers for the sake of timely decisions and occasionally circumvents the traditional chain

of command.¹¹⁹ More direct and timely access to decision makers are inherent to SOF and, given that SOF missions increasingly characterize the HDF, could be relatively easily justified. At the same time, this arrangement would save HUNSOE from being placed under the commander of the conventional land forces and also from being managed along the same lines with the conventional land forces.¹²⁰

2. Force Structure: Similis Simili Gaudet

The SOF capacity of the HDF is currently fractioned; elements of actual and potential SOF are dispersed and assigned to a number of units. For the HDF to possess a potent SOF capability, as opposed to simply a SF unit, the capable elements need first to be turned into conscious SOF or SOF capable units and then organized into one single unit. The potential benefits of uniting SOF include unity of tactical command and control, combined CS and CSS capacity, the concentration of human and materiel resources, an increased potential for SOF's

¹¹⁹ Shortened chain of command, or flattened hierarchy, that is required in the case of SOF as the rule and not the exemption has also been a major source of content toward HUNSF. During the interviews of the survey a fair number of the subjects commented on their responses with regard to whether HUNSF bends rules and follows the regulations more or less than other HDF units. The comments, when voiced, tended to be along the lines of "they do but have no other choice" and "they are forced to do so," because the bureaucracy just cannot cope with the pace of HUNSF's development and the characteristics of SOF combat missions. Blaming the "bureaucracy" would be a cheap argument, since it can do, by design, only certain tasks with efficiency and struggles with the ones that are misfits in its structure.

¹²⁰ The recent organizational adjustment of the JFC empowered the JFC DCOMs with the command functions of the land, air and logistics forces respectively. Without the suggested command arrangement, J9 SOF would most likely fall under the conventional command of DCOM Land Forces. This would raise the very issues the present proposal is trying to mitigate.

representation and leverage and, most importantly, a clear-cut and unified SOF capability in the place of the one that currently exists mostly on paper and is reduced to HUNSF.¹²¹

The proposed combined special operations unit incorporates, at least, the Special Forces, the ranger type light infantry and the civil-military cooperation and psychological operations capabilities that are currently organized into separate units. Since special operations take place in complex and unstable environments, a habitual training relationship between SOF elements is a necessity.¹²² The arrangement of these units into a single special operations unit could provide the HUNSOF, apart from the benefits listed above, with increased status at both the individual and the organizational level. This status and the differentiation from non-SOF units must also be plainly visible to the individual and in the naming of the unit. Moreover, a combined SOF unit would provide the SOF elements with their due status within the Special Operations Forces and the HDF with the much-needed SOF capacity. The proposal of such unit is, nonetheless, very likely to be met with resistance, since its implementation would hurt interests.

First, actors such as unit commanders and supporters of the directly and indirectly involved organizations could see the resulting increased status of SOF as a zero-sum game that is about resources and status. The argument may go that the involved individual units will most likely be worse off in terms of their

¹²¹ In the past four years, the HDF has been involved in three SOF missions in two theaters: Military Advisory and Liaison Teams in Iraq, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and Special Operation Task Units in Afghanistan. Additionally, one could argue whether the deployment of a Close Protection Team to the Kabul International Airport was a SOF mission, given that there was no conventional asset available for the task. Another advisory and training mission is projected to take place in Africa in 2011 and, since there seems to be an ever-increasing demand for SOF in the present security environment, it is very probable that a Special Operations Task Group will be deployed soon after its NATO SOF Evaluation scheduled for the second half of 2010. Also, though the majority of these listed missions were performed solely by HUNSF, not all of these are SF missions. Some of them could be performed by other SOF or as joint, SF and other SOF, missions. This, however, requires a joint HUNSOF capacity.

¹²² Among the many factors that lead to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, as discussed in Chapter III, the absence of such habitual training relationships was imperative, especially since exaggerated secrecy further limited the extent and quality of the ad hoc, pre-mission training between the forces of different services involved.

ability to draw resources and represent their interests when combined into one single unit. This perceived threat could be countered by the careful and coordinated crafting of the proposed SOF unit's command structure and its founding document. The initial process, although prepared by the JFC J9 SOF, will most likely not produce perfection at once; hence, the option for planned annual revisions must be intentionally left open and the first permanent structure introduced only after one or two such revisions. The regulation of the unit commander's rotation may also be an option for consideration.

Second, the ranger-type HDF unit is currently subordinated to an infantry brigade as a consequence of the last larger reorganization of the HDF. That reorganization occurred amid the renaissance of the "light (armored) infantry conception," from which point of view the incorporation of the ranger-type Light Mixed Infantry Battalion into a light infantry brigade seemed justifiable. The wording "light" has since silently disappeared from the names of the HDF infantry brigades and the light armored infantry conception has also been abandoned as the overarching idea. Apart from this consideration, the ranger-type unit itself is in need to fully develop the required SOF organizational culture before the unification can take place.¹²³ Nonetheless, the light infantry concept may well be somewhat revitalized by the proposed SOF unification.¹²⁴

Third, a single SOF unit may seem, from an individual point of view, to decrease career achievement opportunities. This is a legitimate concern given that the contributing units have distinct apexes while the proposed unit will have

¹²³ A favorable move to this desired direction has been made with the appointment of the former deputy commander of the 34th SF Bn as the ranger battalion's commanding officer.

¹²⁴ Luttwak's argument with regard to the attrition and relational-maneuver approach to warfare is already mentioned in a previous chapter in the context of organizational design theory. In the same essay, Luttwak suggests two alternatives for the U.S. Special Forces as the force on the relational-maneuver end of the spectrum to become a meaningful asset. The one finally not chosen by the USASF was "a broader framework in which Special Forces would naturally fit and from which it could draw support: a light infantry branch whose several divisions—much needed in any case—would have a pronounced relational-maneuver orientation and which would be outer-regarding by nature."

Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," *Parameters* (U.S. Army War College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 16–17.

just one. This argument cannot be fully countered; however, the proposed combined SOF unit will need a capable and overstaffed headquarters element that can support both the everyday running of the unit and provide for the key headquarters elements of the deployed special operations components. Moreover, the adjoining organizational adjustments in the SOF command and control, given the lack of SOF trained and educated senior officers and NCOs on the operational and strategic level explained in the previous sections, will not decrease but add to the SOF career opportunities even if the “bureaucratic guerrillas” program is executed.

There are inherent dangers to SF and SOF attributes in the process of the implementation of the above changes. First, without the consensus of all SF and SOF involved the implementation is likely to be malicious and resemble a prisoners’ dilemma. The unilateral departure from what has been agreed on (and what could provide the best outcome for *all parties concerned*) can result in the best possible outcome for *individuals or individual elements* of the agreement. By the very nature of the prisoners’ dilemma, where the players are deprived of communication, this can be only resolved if not executed as a prisoners’ dilemma but with constant and honest communication between the parties.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ Axelrod and Hamilton applied game theory for analyzing interactions between (primitive) organisms, and described the Prisoner’s Dilemma as follows: “Many of the benefits sought by living things are disproportionately available to cooperating groups. While there are considerable differences in what is meant by the terms ‘benefits’ and ‘sought,’ this statement, insofar as it is true, lays down a fundamental basis for all social life. The problem is that while an individual can benefit from mutual cooperation, each one can also do even better by exploiting the cooperative efforts of others. Over a period of time, the same individuals may interact again, allowing for complex patterns of strategic interactions. Game theory in general, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in particular, allow a formalization of the strategic possibilities inherent in such situations. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is an elegant embodiment of the problem of achieving mutual cooperation, and therefore provides the basis for our analysis. [...] In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, two individuals can each either cooperate or defect. The payoff to a player is in terms of the effect on its fitness (survival and fecundity). No matter what the other does, the selfish choice of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. But if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated.

”Robert M. Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, “The evolution of cooperation,” *Science* (American Association for the Advancement of Science) 211, no. 4489 (March 1981): 1390–1396, 1391.

Moreover, sequencing matters in the implementation process, as do each elements of the proposal. Establishing the JFC J9 SOF without subsequently unifying the tactical level SOF elements is meaningless for the HUNSOF capacity that is the ultimate goal. A prematurely unified HUNSOF without the necessary organizational culture and its relevant representation at the operational and strategic level is even worse. The JFC J9 would not have a chance to prepare the bureaucratic and legislative environment for the unification, and the new unit would not be able to resist the conventional military's natural management attempts. As a result, the HUNSOF capacity would become a conventional asset—losing its delicate attributes in the process. Without creating a generally understanding and permissive environment by the implementation of the education and training program, the attempts to unify all parties would most likely be seen as acts of “cowboys” in pursuit of individual rather than organizational HDF interests.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The shift from HUNSF to HUNSOF is necessary, because, from the HDF's point of view, HUNSOF can have more utility as a complete package. This SOF capability can also potentially add to stated national interests in terms of homeland defense and by contributing to the allied commitments and obligations in a security environment where there seems to exist an ever-increasing need for SOF as inter-state conflicts are being replaced by non-state-specific asymmetric threats. The HUNSOF capacity is also in the best interest of HUNSF, since—by extending the capacity—the leverage and status of all concerned parties expand and this expansion creates more favorable conditions for HUNSOF development and employment.

The elements of the shift to HUNSOF include more open, targeted and proportionate communications on primarily the public and internal spheres. The goal is to explain HUNSOF capabilities and limitations in order to combat ambiguity and lack of understanding. The unification of the major SOF

components on the tactical level and the adjustments to the present command and control relationships must be preceded by the educational and organizational exposure of select non-SOF JFC and MoD staff personnel to HUNSOF. Such interaction will create the environmental conditions, an assortment of active and committed SOF-educated supporters within the military's relevant segment, which are necessary but not sufficient for SOF unification and command and control arrangements. The implementation of these changes and adjustments has the potential of spoiling the distinctive SF organizational values; hence, the proposed transformation must be based upon consensus. The planning and execution processes need to address both the most and the least obvious individual and organizational concerns and possible adverse consequences of the arrangements.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The initial hypotheses of the present thesis were tested by the study of SF's historical evolution, organizational design theory, and by conducting empirical research throughout the bureaucratic environment of HUNSF. The findings of the theory research and the statistical and quantitative analysis of the collected data largely correlate with the expectations and the model that describes the causal mechanisms among the independent and dependent variables.

The most significant result of the statistical analysis is that increasingly corresponding military values between the conventional military's bureaucratic environment and that of HUNSF's are the factor that increases the permissiveness of HUNSF's immediate operating environment the most. At the same time, the research found HUNSF's perceived attitude toward the conventional military disrespectful, and this has a remarkable adverse effect on the permissiveness of the bureaucratic environment. Contrary to the expectations, organizational exposure to HUNSF was also found to have a negative impact on the environment, while educational exposure proved to be also negative, though statistically insignificant.

Based on the research and contrary to the unstated expectations, the bureaucratic environment appears to be generally receptive to an increased interaction with and is essentially approving of HUNSF—and not only appreciates its unique attributes, but also would like to see some of those advanced in the HDF. From this perspective, HUNSF can be utilized as a vehicle for fostering the long-desired paradigm shift in terms of military organizational culture.

The research also ascertained that the discrimination between special forces/operations and conventional forces/operations is based on speculative rather than informational and educational grounds. Moreover, the secretiveness

that has characterized HUNSF since its formation, as affirmed by the research, has also disabled the flow of information on HUNSF. The research could not clearly validate the assumption that this lack of adequate information contributes to the low perceived utility of HUNSF as an HDF capability. Nevertheless, it is probably reasonable to say that one cannot form an informed judgment without sufficient and accurate information.

B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL EXAMPLES AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: MINOR CHANGES FOR MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS

Deduced from the historical examples of SOF evolution and the study of organizational design theory, the second stage of SOF development must focus on the consolidation of the capability. This consolidation must be guided by the analysis of and the adaptation to HUNSF's immediate organizational or bureaucratic environment.

Since alignment of the military organizational values was found the most significant in the empirical research, HUNSF needs to influence these values in the bureaucratic environment to have them more aligned with those of HUNSF. Traditionally, education and experience are the vehicles of value forming. Henceforth, increased and deliberate informational, organizational and educational exposure to SOF is desired for which the present thesis offers methods and programs. Given that the respective results of the empirical research suggest a general receptiveness in the HDF for HUNSF and what it represents, the investment into these programs does not appear to require huge efforts, but promise considerable returns. The execution of these programs must be paralleled by HUNSF displaying a more respectful attitude toward the conventional military.

The other aspect of the consolidation is that of securing substantial leverage and becoming an inevitable capacity of the HDF. Given that the HDF is small in size and joint in terms of operational level command and control and has a limited capacity to project CS and CSS, HUNSF is unlikely to become a

separate and self-sustaining service of the HDF with a distinct SOCOM-like command and control arrangement. Moreover, in its current form, HUNSF cannot secure substantial and sustainable leverage on either the operational or the strategic level. For leverage to be achieved and dependence on individual influential sponsors to be replaced by institutionalized sponsorship, the present special forces capacity must be broadened into a SOF capacity, and attempts must be made to adjust the current command and control arrangements to the necessities of the prospective HUNSOF.

The suggested adjustments include the establishment of a coordinating and advisory body at the strategic level, as well as turning the existing JFC J9 CIMIC into a SOF branch with somewhat unique command arrangements. These command and control elements would then unify all of HDF's SOF capability at the tactical level and provide this capacity with adequate status and representation from the tactical to the strategic level. More importantly, the suggested changes would also support the unity of effort necessary for turning the present dispersed HDF SOF potentials into a meaningful SOF capability for which there seems to be an ever-increasing demand.

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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

A. Definitions

HUNSF: In the conduct of this interview, HUNSF refers to the HDF 34th Special Forces Battalion, the Joint Force Command J3 Spec Ops section, and other military personnel directly associated with the development of the HDF's SOF capacity.

B. Interview questions

1. How long have you been in your current position?

2. In what branch have you served the longest period prior to the current appointment?

3. Have you been deployed to any combat mission?

Yes	No
-----	----

If you answered Yes: Have you ever worked with national or other Special Operations Forces?

National	Other SOF	No
----------	-----------	----

4. If you had to recall one single occasion when you first heard/learnt something significant about SOF, what would it be?

5. To what extent has education on SOF been part of your military training and education? (1: none; 7: very significant)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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6. What type of education have you received on special operations and SOF? Please leave it blank if you have not received such education.

Course(s)	Seminar(s)	Graduate classes
-----------	------------	------------------

7. How often do you or the branch under your jurisdiction interact with HUNSF related issues? (1: never; 7: every day)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

8. To what extent do you think the following characteristics describe HUNSF? (1: not at all; 7: completely)

a. High level of training

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

b. High-tech hardware

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

c. Superior leadership

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

d. Secrecy

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

e. Well-connected in the highest level military leadership

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

f. Despise of non-HUNSF units and/or personnel

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

g. Hardworking personnel in the 34th SF Bn

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

h. Dedicated advocates within the MoD and the JFC

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

i. HUNSF bends rules

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

9. What do you think the main difference is between special operations/special forces and conventional operations/forces?

10. Do you think that special operations can be conducted by conventional forces?

Yes	Some ops can, others cannot.	No
-----	------------------------------	----

11. What do you think the core tasks of HUNSF are?

- a. Direct Actions
- b. Special Reconnaissance
- c. Training and mentoring of allied military or paramilitary forces
- d. C/SAR
- e. Military Assistance
- f. Counter-Insurgency
- g. Counter-Terrorism
- h. Irregular/Unconventional Warfare
- i. Operations with significant strategic military and/or political impact

12. Of the following organizational values which ones do you think are the most important for the military as a whole?

Respect	Competency	Ambition
Diversity	Service	Individuality
Loyalty	Responsibility	Equality
Credibility	Accuracy	Integrity
Honesty	Excellence	Dedication
Quality	Accountability	Improvement
Discipline/Order	Friendliness	Innovativeness
Rules/Regulations	Learning	Efficiency
Wisdom	Courage	Challenge
Authority	Accomplishment	Independence
Dignity	Dependability	Flexibility
Compliance	Optimism	Collectivism
Influence	Collaboration	Teamwork

13. To what extent do you think the ones you have chosen are valid for the HDF? (1: not at all; 7: completely)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

14. Of the most important organizational values of the military you have indicated which ones do you think HUNSF should adapt/foster more?

15. Of the following organizational values which ones do you think HUNSF regards the most?

Respect	Competency	Ambition
Diversity	Service	Individuality
Loyalty	Responsibility	Equality

Credibility	Accuracy	Integrity
Honesty	Excellence	Dedication
Quality	Accountability	Improvement
Discipline/Order	Friendliness	Innovativeness
Rules/Regulations	Learning	Efficiency
Wisdom	Courage	Challenge
Authority	Accomplishment	Independence
Dignity	Dependability	Flexibility
Compliance	Optimism	Collectivism
Influence	Collaboration	Teamwork

16. Of HUNSF's most important organizational values you indicated, which ones do you think the whole military should adapt/foster more?

17. Do you think that HUNSF believes special translates as better?

(1: don't agree at all; 7: completely agree)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

18. Do you think that HUNSF disregards the conventional military?

(1: don't agree at all; 7: completely agree)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

19. Do you think that HUNSF "plays by the book" as the rule or as the exemption?

(1: doesn't play by the book at all; 4: no difference compared to other HDF units; 7: plays completely by the book).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

20. The proportion of HUNSF in the HDF combat troops is about 3% (given that the HDF combat troops number about 10,000). If you had to take an educated guess, where would you put the percentage of the national financial and materiel resources that are allocated for HUNSF development compared to the annual budget of the HDF?

	%
--	---

21.If you had to take an educated guess, where would you put the percentage of the allied financial and materiel resources that are allocated for HUNSF development compared to the annual non-national resources the HDF receives?

	%
--	---

22.Do you think that the above estimates are proportionate to the military and political utility of HUNSF?

(1: don't agree at all; 7: completely agree)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

23.Do you think that HUNSF tries to recruit valuable human resources from the HDF? (1: don't agree at all; 7: completely agree)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

24.Do you think that the resources that are allocated for HUNSF could produce more political return on investment if they were devoted to some other capabilities of the HDF?

(1: don't agree at all; 7: completely agree)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

25.Do you think that the resources that are allocated for HUNSF could produce more return on investment militarily if they were devoted to some other capabilities of the HDF?

(1: don't agree at all; 7: completely agree)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

26.How integral do you think HUNSF is to the functioning of the HDF?

(1: not integral at all, 7: indispensable)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

27.Do you think the capacity (not the personnel) of HUNSF should be increased or decreased for the optimal functioning of the HDF?

(1: should be disbanded, 4: current form sufficient, and 7: should be increased)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

28. What capabilities do you think should be preferred in the place of HUNSF?

- a. Airlift (RW and/or FW)
- b. Air assault (RW)
- c. Conventional assets (MBTs, artillery, APCs, AT, air defense, etc.)
- d. Intelligence collection and exploitation means
- e. Information and communication technology
- f. Morale and Welfare
- g. CS and CSS capacity
- h. Land transportation means
- i. Other (please specify)
- j. None, as HUNSF is an important capability of the HDF

APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY DATA¹²⁶

A. DATA TESTING

The following tables and figures are excerpts from the STATA software-generated data analysis results. The coding “relatt” refers to the first proxy dependent variable (HDF’s relative attitude toward HUNSF) that is used in the statistical model for the data analysis in Chapter IV.




Figure 6. Residual analysis: Kernel density test

¹²⁶ For the statistical analysis the Stata Corporation’s Stata/SE 10.0 for Macintosh and the Microsoft Excel 2008 for Mac Version 12.2.4 (100205) software were used.




Figure 7. Residual analysis: Normal distribution

Source	chi2	df	p
Heteroskedasticity	21.89	20	0.3971
Skewness	2.82	3	0.4164
Kurtosis	1.89	1	0.2858
Total	24.62	26	0.5485

Table 11. Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test

H0: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of relatt

chi2(1) = 2.72
Prob > chi2 = 0.0988

Table 12. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

No: model has no omitted variables
F(3, 12) = 0.72
Prob > F = 0.5588

Table 13. Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of DV1 (relative attitude toward HUNSF)

B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of observations	21
				F(5, 15)	4.67
Model	1.466	5	0.293	Prob > F	0.0091
Residual	0.943	15	0.062	R-squared	0.6087
		20		Adj R-squared	0.4782
Total	2.41		20.12	Root MSE	0.25076

HDF's relative attitude toward HUNSF	Coefficient	Std. error	t	P> t	Beta
Subjects' operational exposure to SOF	-0.033	0.024	-1.39	0.186	-0.251944
Subjects' educational exposure to SOF	-0.063	0.042	-1.48	0.16	-0.2622533
Subjects' organizational exposure to HUNSF	-0.001	0.011	-0.08	0.937	-0.0160903
HUNSF's perceived attitude toward HDF	-0.094	0.036	-2.62	0.019	-0.4434
Degree of mil. org. value alignment	0.074	0.031	2.37	0.031	0.3891057
Constant	1.893	0.304	6.22	0	.

Table 14. The model's regression analysis

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APPENDIX C: INFORMATION-SHARING PROPOSAL OUTLINE

The HDF Web site intended for the public may have at least two functions. First, inform, beyond sheer “public relations” in a way that is easily digestible, on how public funds are spent in defense and emphasize the public utility of that spending; second, assist recruitment for the military. For informational and recruitment purposes, HDF activities that have the potential to attract considerable attention could and should also be covered here, not only by professional journalists, but by military personnel with boots on the ground.

This proposed Web site, which could be based on the present HDF site and elements of MoD’s site, need target mainly the young adults and the active (daily) Internet users. The site will have to adapt to these users’ demands and expectations in terms of user friendliness. The full range of Web 2.0 applications—to include the opportunity for leaving feedbacks on news, events, recruitment process and experiences, etc.—is a must in this case. The management of the site needs to be innovative and responsive to upkeep on the desired amount of visits, or “hits,” on the Web site.

The MoD and HDF should be responsible for collecting the credits for military stories of mass interest. Such news and events should be published on the military’s own Web sites, rather than leaving this sort of journalism to other media whose accounts may not be accurate. Content that is contributed by non-professional journalists, but professional service members, can well serve this purpose. Also, should it come to less favorable news or stories, the MoD and the HDF has more chance to frame them by covering them in detail. Leaving such items to other sources that, in their legitimate attempt to satisfy public interest, may come up with inaccurate reporting, that does more harm to the military than the other option would. Attempts at *cover-ups* is certainly not a viable option in the age of mass communication, where everyone is a potential “strategic corporal” with his or her mobile media devices and access to the Internet.

The English language site designed for the international audience could give a detailed oversight on the military, its mission, organization and structure. Such a Web site would obviously be organized around general and actual subjects that are rooted in the military's international and allied engagements. These could include conference proceedings, diplomatic level visits and the activity of deployed military units. Such a Web site would require somewhat less strict oversight, as interactivity is not as desirable here as in the previous case.

Third, the military's internal communication also requires a considerable change—not in terms of paradigm, but in deeds. The paradigm with regard to both internal information management and openness has already changed. This can be noticed in the pragmatism of the following excerpt from HDF JFC Commander Lieutenant General Benkő's opening memorandum published on the MoD's internal Web site called Dialogue:

As a first thought, I am asking for your cooperation with the intention of realizing our goals and tasks with responsibility and on the grounds of common understanding. To achieve this, we must dedicate special attention to our own internal communication, which is one of the most significant elements of modern command, control and coordination. This internal communication means the exposure of our work—and profession-related remarks, thoughts and suggestions, and an honest flow of information—in sum, the dialogue itself [translation by the author].¹²⁷

These sentences are very well aligned with Bok's observations on actual publicity discussed in Chapter V. Interestingly enough, the JFC Commander's above intent needs merely one thing for it to become a very strong encouragement for MoD and HDF personnel to actively participate in both public and internal communication. The intent needs to be widely and credibly communicated.

¹²⁷ Lieutenant General Tibor Benkő, *Magyar Honvédség Összahaderőnemi Parancsnokság (Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command)*, https://www.parbeszed.hm.gov.hu/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=246&parentname=CommunityPage&parentid=3&mode=2&in_hi_userid=339145&cached=true (accessed March 9, 2010).

Encouragement, however, may not be a particularly easy task, given that five years ago there was a serious blow to the very notion the JFC Commander is now trying to advance in his intent.¹²⁸

The present Dialogue Web site can be an outstanding vehicle for the desired internal communication by becoming more user-friendly, interactive and unique in content. User-friendliness is a matter of structuring the content and making it visually attractive. This needs expertise, but virtually no additional funding or hardware. Another aspect of user-friendliness is maintaining security that also enables responsible conduct on the Web site by the virtue of the fact that positive identification (registration) is currently required to access the site. This very fact largely diminishes the risk of the site being frequently visited by “hooligans” or adversaries whose “contribution” is neither desired nor welcome.

As for the content of the proposed enhanced Dialogue site, it needs to become a *platform for military academia and scientific research*. This suggestion is not as far-fetched as it may sound, since the military has several journals and periodicals. These, however, have an unduly limited distribution, accessibility and, henceforth, audience. It is opined that this is mainly due to the fact that

¹²⁸ The history of the HDF Dialogue Portal goes back to 2005 when an Army captain addressed what he considered legitimate concerns with regard to the functioning of the HDF and the materiel and non-materiel support of the HDF's first unit deployed under ISAF command. The captain published these concerns in a memorandum to the Minister of Defense on the HDF's official Web site's Forum section. The memo generated massive waves of, often obscene, comments; the Forum was subsequently shot down some weeks later. The Forum, though, did not cease to exist but migrated to another, non-MoD Web site and has been alive since. The HDF, maybe in lieu of the shot-down Forum, initiated the Dialogue process that, at first, was organized around real-life conferences on different organizational levels and pay grades. Later on, the MoD-sponsored Dialogue Portal kicked off on the Internet and it has been active to date with very limited signs of interactivity from users, who are now required to register with their SSN to access the site.

Szabó József Bartha, *A százados levele Afganisztánból – ribillió a vezérkarban és a minisztériumban (The Captain's letter from Afghanistan-Scandal in the General Staff)*, 25 February, 2005, <http://www.gondola.hu/cikkek/40787> (accessed March 11, 2010).

[origo], *Ügyészégi vizsgálat az afganisztáni misszió miatt (JAG investigates the Afghanistan mission)*, March 3, 2005, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20050303azugyeszsegre.html> (accessed March 11, 2010).

Gyula Haraszti and Dávid Kaposi, *A katonai ügyészség cáfolja a bírálatokat (JAG refuses criticisms)*, June 30, 2005, <http://www.mno.hu/portal/293314> (accessed March 11, 2010).

these journals are produced in print and only recently are available online in downloadable portable document format (pdf). This thesis suggests that every journal and periodical should be made available on the Dialogue site in HTML and made interactive by providing an opportunity to comment on the individual essays, research papers, reports, etc. This, again, would add to both the achievement of the Commander's intent in terms of "exposure of our work—and profession-related remarks, thoughts and suggestions and an honest flow of information" and the Bok test of "actual publicity" manifested in carefully crafted arguments, revealing the reasoning and offering space for counterarguments and counter-counterarguments.

The above proposals seem to be fully aligned with the goals of the internal communication as articulated by Lieutenant General Benkő, even though his address concerns the HDF only:

The goal of our communications through the Dialogue Web site is twofold. On the one hand, the objective here is to convey credible information and a realistic picture on the functioning and the organization [of the JFC], and to effectively depict the social and professional circumstances of the military society as well as the actual condition of our organizational values and the evolution of the organizational culture. On the other hand, the goal is also to provide opportunities for the visitors [of the Web site] to express their views with regard to a variety of issues affecting the service members and, thereby, enable the visitors to become engaged in the shaping and realization of our efforts and goals [translation by the author].¹²⁹

What follows is that the Dialogue site needs to be interactive; the site must host both user-initiated and offered-subject blogs and discussion topics relevant to the military in order to be in accordance with the Commander's intent.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Lieutenant General Tibor Benkő, *Magyar Honvédség Összahaderőnemi Parancsnokság (Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command)*, https://www.parbeszed.hm.gov.hu/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=246&parentname=CommunityPage&parentid=3&mode=2&in_hi_userid=339145&cached=true (accessed March 9, 2010).

¹³⁰ For a detailed account on the prospective role of blogs in military information strategy see: Dorothy Denning and James Kinniburgh, "Blogs and Military Information Strategy," *Joint Special Operations University*, June 2006: 1–31.

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